

Topic 7: Community driven development



[A World Bank toolkit](#)

Definition

Definition: community-driven development (CDD) is an initiative in the field of development that **provides control of the development process, resources and decision making authority directly to groups in the community**. The underlying assumption of CDD projects are that **communities are the best judges of how their lives and livelihoods can be improved** and, if **provided with adequate resources and information, they can organize themselves to provide for their immediate needs**. CDD projects work by providing poor communities with direct funding for development with the communities then deciding how to spend the money. Lastly, the community plans and builds the project and takes responsibility for monitoring its progress. **Responsive to local demands, inclusive** and more **cost-effective** than centrally-led NGO-based programs.


Q?

Mansuri and Rao 2012

LOCALIZING DEVELOPMENT

Community development and decentralization projects, impact and challenges. Key points:

1. Participation modalities: organic participation vs. induced participation (CDD projects).
2. Effectiveness of participatory projects: effective in increasing access to basic services, limited evidence on their effectiveness in enhancing household income or building sustainable participatory institutions. Not a substitute for weak states.
3. Challenges and context: success highly influenced by social, political and geographical contexts – inequality, nature of local leadership.
4. Civil society failure, alongside market and government failures.
5. Policy recommendations: learning-by-doing and context sensitivity + MEL.



What we already know – different success

FROM STUDENTS’ SUMMARIES

- A: Bjorkman and Svensson 2009 - QJE, Power to the People: Evidence from a Randomized Field Experiment on Community-Based Monitoring in Uganda (Group 5) – high success.
- B: Olken 2007 - JPE, Monitoring corruption: evidence from a field experiment in Indonesia (Group 4) – low success.

Why the different outcomes?

- Information provision: available performance cards in A vs. no specific information in project performance in B – knowledge of relevant issues.
- Community engagement and participation: structured process with three types of meetings and an action plan in A vs. elite capture and free-rider problems in B.
- Health vs. Infrastructure.

Findings: Treatment practices

- 8 percentage points, or a 19% increase in the use of any equipment during the examination.
- Wait times (average)
 - 133 minutes in the control facilities vs. 119 in the treatment facilities.
- Treatment Facilities had a 10% lower absence rate
- 3.1 workers were present on average, as compared to 2.3 in the control clinic

Findings: Health outcomes

- Treated communities saw a 33% decrease in child mortality among children under 5
- Increase in child weight

Summary of the Findings:

- The effect of audits stemmed primarily from the **threat of being audited**, rather than corrective actions.
- Auditors found irregularities in **90% of villages**, but most findings were procedural rather than direct corruption evidence.
- **Elite capture** influenced the process, as invitations and comment forms distributed via **neighborhood heads** led to biased responses.
- **Audited villages had a higher likelihood of employing family members**, possibly as an alternative form of rent-seeking.
- The **invitations reduced missing labor expenditures** significantly.
- The **comment forms worked only when distribution bypassed local elites** (via schools).
- The **marginal effect of increasing participation further** (via invitations and comment forms) **may be limited**, but this doesn’t mean grassroots monitoring is ineffective.
- **For grassroots monitoring to be effective**, steps must be taken to **reduce the free-rider problem** and **limit elite capture** of the process.

Community-driven reconstruction – 1

FEARON, HUMPHREYS AND WEINSTEIN 2009 (AER PROCEEDINGS)

A significant share of post-conflict foreign assistance is spent on Community-Driven Reconstruction (CDR) programs, which support the establishment of new local institutions in order to promote social reconciliation.

Fearon, Humphreys, and Weinstein (2009) implemented an RCT (in 82 communities) to evaluate the impact of a CDR project carried out by International Rescue Committee (an international NGO) in northern Liberia.

The project attempted to build democratic, community-level institutions for making and implementing decisions about local public good provision.

Measurement: baseline and follow-up surveys and behavioral data collected from a lab game played by 1979 randomly sampled individuals.

Community-driven reconstruction – 2

FEARON, HUMPHREYS AND WEINSTEIN 2009 (AER PROCEEDINGS)

The CDR program:

The NGO undertook initial activities to sensitize communities to the new development project, including meetings with local chiefs and elders to solicit their cooperation.

In each community, the NGO oversaw:

- Establishment of Community Development Councils (CDC) with representatives of all voting-age adults.
- Select and implement a quick impact project (\$2000-\$4000) followed by a larger development project (average \$17000).

The members of the CDCs were selected in direct elections from among all voting age adults in the villages; CDCs oversaw implementation and continue to have responsibility for project maintenance over time.

Community-driven reconstruction - 3

FEARON, HUMPHREYS AND WEINSTEIN 2009 (AER PROCEEDINGS)

The examined outcome is the amount of funding a community raises for a collective project through anonymous play in a **public-good game**.

Findings suggest that the CDR program improved community cohesion - treatment communities raised significantly more money than control communities

TABLE 1—CDR PROGRAM IMPACT

Outcome	Control communities	Treatment communities	Difference (se)
Share of available funds earned	75.9 percent	82.5 percent	+6.5* (2.6)
Average share of 300LD contributed	75.1 percent	80.8 percent	+5.7* (2.6)
Share contributing full amount	62.3 percent	71.3 percent	+9.1* (3.7)

Notes: The table reports the average treatment effect on the treated, with matching according to assignment to the gender composition treatment; standard errors allow for heteroskedasticity across strata. Results are reported for village level outcomes, for 41 treatment and 41 control communities. * Significant at 95 percent.

Local democratic decision-making – 1

OLKEN 2010 - APSR

Olken (2010) implemented a clustered RCT varying the type of process for choosing development projects – 48 villages in Indonesia – general project and one women's project:

Representative-based meetings;

Direct election-based plebiscites.


Plebiscites resulted in dramatically higher satisfaction among villagers, increased knowledge about the project, greater perceived benefits, and higher reported willingness to contribute.

Changing the political mechanism had much smaller effects on the actual projects selected.

Local democratic decision-making - 2

OLKEN 2010 - APSR

Figure 1: Project Type Selected



Local democratic decision-making – 3

OLKEN 2010 - APSR

Table 7: Impact of Plebiscites on Perceptions of KDP process

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		General Project		Women's Project	
	Pooled	Men	Women	Men	Women
<i>Questions</i>					
Was the project chosen in accordance with your wishes?	0.464** (0.188)	1.031*** (0.311)	0.667** (0.329)	0.159 (0.303)	0.754** (0.335)
Will the proposal benefit you personally?	0.484** (0.191)	0.587* (0.319)	1.069*** (0.298)	0.180 (0.255)	0.383 (0.312)
Will you use the project?	0.970** (0.381)	0.809 (0.644)	. (0.321)	0.794 (0.638)	1.003* (0.557)
Was the chosen proposal fair?	0.431** (0.186)	0.756*** (0.265)	0.833*** (0.321)	0.102 (0.287)	0.636** (0.287)
Is the chosen proposal in accordance with the people's aspirations?	0.405** (0.189)	0.605** (0.256)	0.932*** (0.282)	0.091 (0.282)	0.534 (0.367)
Are you satisfied with KDP? (not project specific)	0.625** (0.263)	0.691** (0.271)	0.528* (0.314)	. (0.314)	. (0.314)

Local democratic decision-making – 4

OLKEN 2010 - APSR

Table 8: Impact of plebiscites on KDP voluntary contributions

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
		General Project		Women’s Project	
	Pooled	Men	Women	Men	Women
<i>If the project happens, will you contribute...?</i>					
Labor	0.164** (0.062)	0.207* (0.079)	0.271*** (0.088)	0.127 (0.077)	0.087 (0.100)
Money	-0.043* (0.021)	-0.104* (0.047)	-0.002 (0.017)	. (0.019)	-0.02 (0.019)
Anything	0.178*** (0.055)	0.192* (0.075)	0.304*** (0.073)	0.116 (0.072)	0.145 (0.084)

Notes: Each cell is the marginal effect of the plebiscite dummy from a different probit regression. Robust standard errors in parentheses, adjusted for clustering at the village level. Dependent variables are 0/1 dummies, with “yes” receiving a score of 1 and “no” a score of 0. All regressions contain phase fixed effects and controls for gender, age, log per capita expenditure, number of household members, and occupation. See also Notes to Table 7.

* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

Local democratic decision-making – 5

OLKEN 2010 - APSR

Table 9: Impact of plebiscites on knowledge and dialog

	(1)		
<i>Knowledge:</i>	Pooled	Men	Women
Did the respondent correctly identify the type and location of the selected general proposal?	0.218* (0.108)	0.212* (0.109)	0.255* (0.148)
Did the respondent correctly identify the type and location of the selected women's proposal?	0.288*** (0.086)	0.240** (0.089)	0.370*** (0.126)
<i>Discussions:</i>			
Did you discuss development issues with anyone?	-0.013 (0.031)	. .	-0.132 (0.147)
Did you discuss development issues with any household members?	0.015 (0.076)	0.039 (0.059)	-0.121 (0.147)
Did you discuss development issues with anyone in government?	-0.003 (0.078)	-0.011 (0.130)	-0.039 (0.075)

Notes: See Notes to Tables 7 and 8.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.

In recent years, the effort to expand community engagement in service delivery has introduced participatory initiatives in sectors such as education, health projects, social protection and agriculture, which have some of the features of CDD.

Thanks for your attention and contributions!