Macroeconomics II

– Preliminary – Nova SBE 2025

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Kaldor (1961) stylized facts

On average, over long periods of time:

- O The growth rate of output is constant.
- O The capital-labor ratio grows at a constant rate.
- O The capital-income ratio is constant.
- O Capital and labor shares of income are constant.
- O Real rates of return are close to constant.
- O Dispersion of growth rates across countries.

Growth Theories

- O We have seen before that a production technology that combines symmetrically physical and human capital, with constant returns to scale, can generate endogenous (constant perpetual) growth.
- O Additionally, we've seen how that model behaves like an economy with only one capital stock, and a linear production function.
- O In general, what is required in order to have endogenous (perpetual) growth is a "core" of capital goods whose production does not involve nonreproducible factors.

O Rebelo (1991)

O Other models have endogenous growth (constant or increasing) through externalities and increasing returns:
 O Romer (1986).

One-sector model

O Recall the one-sector model:

$$K_{t+1} = AK_t^{\alpha} N_t^{1-\alpha} + (1-\delta)K_t - C_t$$
(1)
$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} \equiv g_{Kt} = AK_t^{\alpha-1} N_t^{1-\alpha} + 1 - \delta - \frac{C_t}{K_t}$$

O Even if all resources are devoted to capital accumulation,

$$C_t = 0$$
,

the presence of decreasing returns ($\alpha < 1$) to the only factor of production that can be accumulated, K_t , implies that

$$g_{Kt}
ightarrow 0$$

• Only one reproducible factor, K_t ,

O Produced with a nonreproducible factor, N_t .

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One-sector model: exogenous growth

O The neoclassical model, with constant returns to scale, can be consistent with perpetual growth by making the production function time dependent:

$$K_{t+1} = AK_t^{\alpha} (X_t N_t)^{1-\alpha} + (1-\delta)K_t - C_t$$
(2)

- O X_t grows at exogenously given rate g_x (technological progress).
- O It is possible for output, investment, and consumption to grow at rate g_x .
- O Fairly uninteresting growth theory: the growth rate of the economy is determined by a single exogenous aspect of technology.

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One-sector model: endogenous growth

O One simple way to generate endogenous growth in a one-sector economy is to assume α = 1:

$$K_{t+1} = AK_t + (1-\delta)K_t - C_t$$
(3)

O Possible for output, investment, and consumption to grow at constant rates:

$$\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} \equiv 1 + g_{Kt} = A + 1 - \delta - \frac{C_t}{K_t}$$

O Indeed, from the Euler equation when $U(C) = C^{\gamma}/\gamma$:

$$C_{t+1}/C_t = g_{ct} = (\beta A)^{1/(1-\gamma)}$$
 (4)

O Only one reproducible factor, produced without direct or indirect contribution of nonreproducible factors (K_t is the only factor here).

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Multi-sector models, endogenous growth

- O In general, as long as the technology to produce capital is linearly homogeneous and there is a "core" of capital goods that is produced without nonreproducible factors, perpetual growth is feasible.
- O Example: two sectors of production.
- O Capital sector uses fraction $1 \phi_t$ of the available capital stock to produce investment goods I_t with a linear technology:

$$I_t = AK_t(1 - \phi_t) \tag{5}$$

- O Capital depreciates at rate δ : $K_{t+1} = (1 \delta)K_t + I_t$
- Consumption sector combines the remaining capital stock with a nonreproducible factor *L* to produce consumption goods:

$$C_t = B(K_t \phi_t)^{\alpha} L^{1-\alpha}$$
(6)

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Multi-sector models, endogenous growth

O Capital can grow at any rate between $(A - \delta)$ and $-\delta$:

$$\phi_t = 0 : g_{kt} = A - \delta,$$

$$\phi_t = 1 : g_{kt} = -\delta.$$

 Consumption can grow at a rate proportional to the growth rate of capital:

$$C_{t+1}/C_t = \left(rac{K_{t+1}}{K_t}rac{\phi_{t+1}}{\phi_t}
ight)^{lpha}$$

O Indeed, from the Euler equation with $U(C) = C^{\gamma}/\gamma$:

$$C_{t+1}/C_t = \left[\beta \left(\frac{K_{t+1}}{K_t} \frac{\phi_{t+1}}{\phi_t}\right)^{\alpha-1} \left(A+1-\delta\right)\right]^{1/(1-\gamma)}$$
(7)

O Note that B or L do not affect the growth rates.

O Note that B = A and $\alpha = 1$ we are back to the AK model.

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Multi-sector models, endogenous growth

- Note that the assumption that capital is linearly produced is not essential.
- The technology to produce capital does not need to be linear but only constant returns to scale: linearly homogeneous.
- O Previous class: physical capital and human capital with constant returns technology.

O Lucas (1988): reproducibility of human capital.

O Reproducible human capital and physical capital, constant returns. Linear production of human capital.

O Uzawa (1965)

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Growth and Externalities

O Arrow (1962), Romer (1986): increasing returns to capital.O Technology:

$$y_t = f(K_t, k_t, n_t), \tag{8}$$

- O Technological progress is external to firms (how k_t affects K_t).
- O Given K_t , f is linearly homogeneous in k_t and n_t .
- O f increasing in aggregate K_t , $f(\sum k, k, n)$ convex in k.
- 0 K_t aggregate "knowledge", increasing with individual k_t , $K_t = \sum k_t$.
- O Romer (1986): Decreasing returns in the production of new knowledge (upper bound on feasible growth rates): Consistent with equilibrium accelerating growth rate.

Romer (1986) example

- O Technology: $y_t = A(K_t^{1-\alpha})k_t^{\alpha}n_t^{1-\alpha}$, $A > 0, \alpha \in (0, 1)$
- O CRRA utility: $U(c) = c^{1-\sigma}/(1-\sigma)$, $n_t = 1$.
- O Competitive equilibrium:

$$0 \quad c_{t+1}/c_t = \left(\beta(r_t + 1 - \delta)\right)^{1/\sigma}$$
$$0 \quad r_t = F_k = \alpha A K_t^{1-\alpha} k_t^{\alpha-1} n_t^{1-\alpha} \to \alpha A \quad (K_t = k_t)$$

O Social planner:

$$(\mathsf{MPK}) \quad F_k = A \tag{9}$$

- O $\alpha < 1$: Higher consumption growth in the planner solution.
- O Lower investment in competitive equilibrium outcome.
- O What are the private incentives? If all firms choose social optimum k, what's the incentive for one individual firm?

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Growth and Externalities

- O Uzawa (1965), Lucas (1988): allocation of time affects human capital accumulation, human capital affects productivity of other factors.
- O Technology:

$$y_t = f(H_t, k_t, h_t n_t), \qquad (10)$$

- O Technological progress is external to firms (how h_t affects H_t).
- O Given H_t , f is linearly homogeneous in k_t and $h_t n_t$.
- O f increasing in aggregate H_t .
- \circ H_t aggregate human capital, increasing with individual h_t .
- O As we have seen, no need for external effect of H_t to obtain endogenous growth.
- O But this effect implies divergence of social and private value of h_t .

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How do taxes affect growth?

Tax Distorted Competitive Equilibrium: Household problem

Consider the competitive equilibrium of an economy where output is produced using physical capital k_t , human capital h_t , and labor n_t . Labor is supplied inelastically and w_t is the wage rate per unit of effective labor. r_t is the rental price of k_t . p_t is the price of time t consumption. A government taxes incomes from physical capital and effective labor, and T_t are lump-sum transfers.

The representative household solves

$$\max \sum_{t} \beta^{t} u(c_{t}) \tag{11}$$

subject to:

$$k_{t+1} \le (1 - \delta_k)k_t + x_{kt},\tag{12}$$

$$h_{t+1} \le (1 - \delta_h)h_t + x_{ht},\tag{13}$$

$$\sum_{t} p_t(c_t + x_{kt} + x_{ht}) \le \sum_{t} p_t \left[(1 - \tau_{kt}) r_t k_t + (1 - \tau_{ht}) w_t h_t + T_t \right]$$
(14)

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Tax Distorted Competitive Equilibrium: Firm problem

The firm solves

$$\max p_t [F(k_t, z_{2t}) - w_t z_{2t} - r_t k_t], \qquad (15)$$

where $z_{2t} = n_t h_t$ is the the number of effective labor hours purchased by the firm.

Consumer's budget constraint

We can rewrite the consumer's budget constraint as

$$\sum_{t} p_{t}(c_{t} - T_{t}) \leq W_{0} \equiv \left[(1 - \tau_{k0})r_{0} + 1 - \delta_{k} \right] k_{0} + \left[(1 - \tau_{h0})w_{0} + 1 - \delta_{h} \right] h_{0}, \quad (16)$$

where we have use standard no-arbitrage conditions, normalized $p_0 = 1$, and assumed an interior solution $x_{kt} > 0$, $x_{ht} > 0$ for all t.

The Ramsey Planner's problem is to choose sequences of

 c_t , k_t , h_t , x_{ht} , x_{kt} , τ_{kt} , τ_{ht} , p_t , w_t , and r_t

to maximize the rep agent welfare subject to the constraints given by the competitive equilibrium conditions.

The initial stocks k_0 and h_0 , and the sequences of g_t and T_t are taken as given.

Primal Approach

As we have seen before, the problem can be simplified to eliminate

 $\tau_{kt}, \tau_{ht}, p_t, w_t$, and r_t

using the CE conditions. After doing so, the problem becomes:

$$\max \sum_{t} \beta^{t} u(c_{t})$$
(17)

subject to:

$$\sum_{t} \beta^{t} (c_{t} - T_{t}) u_{c}(t) - \mathcal{W}_{0} = 0, \qquad (18)$$

$$c_t + x_{kt} + x_{ht} + g_t = F(k_t, h_t),$$
 (19)

$$k_{t+1} \le (1-\delta_k)k_t + x_{kt},\tag{20}$$

$$h_{t+1} \le (1 - \delta_h)h_t + x_{ht},\tag{21}$$

$$k_0$$
 and h_0 given. (22)

$$\mathcal{W}_{0} = u_{c}(0) \{ [(1 - \tau_{k0})F_{k}(0) + 1 - \delta_{k}]k_{0} + [(1 - \tau_{h0})F_{h}(0) + 1 - \delta_{h}]h_{0} \}$$

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O Under these assumptions, we obtain that

$$\lim_{t\to\infty}\tau_{kt}=0,\qquad\qquad\lim_{t\to\infty}\tau_{ht}=0.$$
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 Note that this result holds despite the assumption that labor supply is inelastic.

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Tax Distorted Competitive Equilibrium: Example

Suppose that consumer preferences are given according to

$$u(c)=\frac{c^{1-\sigma}}{1-\sigma},$$

and the production function is

$$F(k, h) = Ak^{\alpha}h^{1-\alpha}$$
, with $\delta_k = \delta_h = \delta$.

We can show that if a steady-state balanced growth path exists, it must be that:

$$\frac{h_t}{k_t} = \frac{(1-\alpha)(1-\tau_h)}{\alpha(1-\tau_k)}$$
(24)

O A higher τ_h decreases the steady state h/k. O A higher τ_k increases the steady state h/k.

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Tax Distorted Competitive Equilibrium: Example

We can also show that along a balanced growth path equilibrium:

$$\frac{c_{t+1}}{c_t} = \frac{k_{t+1}}{k_t} = \frac{h_{t+1}}{h_t} = \\
= \left(\beta \left(A \left[(1-\alpha)(1-\tau_h) \right]^{1-\alpha} \left[\alpha(1-\tau_k) \right]^{\alpha} + 1 - \delta \right) \right)^{1/\sigma} \tag{25}$$

O A higher τ_h or τ_k decreases steady state growth of consumption.

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Readings

- O "On the mechanics of economic development", R. Lucas (1988)
- O "Increasing Returns and Long-Run Growth", P. Romer (1986)
- O "Long-Run Policy Analysis and Long-Run Growth", S. Rebelo (1991)
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