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Resources and Resourcefulness: Strategic Capacity in the Unionization of California Agriculture, 1959–1966[1]

Marshall Ganz
Harvard University

Why did the insurgent United Farm Workers (UFW) succeed while its better-resourced rival—the Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee, AFL-CIO (AWOC)—failed? Explanations relying on altered political opportunity structures or resources, accounts of Cesar Chavez's charismatic leadership, or descriptions of UFW strategy fail to identify mechanisms for creating effective strategy. By analyzing leadership, organizational influences on actors' choices, and their interaction within the environment, this study shows that greater access to salient information, heuristic facility, and motivation generated more effective strategy. Differences in "strategic capacity" can explain how resourcefulness can compensate for lack of resources, why some new organizations can overcome the "liability of newness," and how reorganizational "focal" moments may lead to a social movement.

> The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society.
> (C. Wright Mills, *The Sociological Imagination*)

INTRODUCTION

Until the success of the United Farm Workers (UFW) in the 1960s and 1970s, repeated efforts to unionize California's 400,000 farmworkers had failed.[2] Since 1900, three major attempts at labor organization had been

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[2] The union which has called itself the United Farm Workers (UFW) since 1972 called itself the Farm Workers Association (FWA) from 1962 to 1964, the National Farm Workers Association from 1964 to 1966 (NFWA), and the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC) from 1966 to 1972. When referring to the organiza-

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made by four different unions: the Industrial Workers of the World (IWW) prior to World War I; the Cannery, Agricultural, and Industrial Workers Union (CAIWU) and United Cannery, Agricultural Packing, and Allied Workers CIO (UCAPAWA) in the 1930s; and the National Farm Labor Union AFL (NFLU) in the 1940s. By the spring of 1966, however, just four years after it had begun organizing and six months after calling its first strike, the UFW signed the first multiyear union contract to cover California farmworkers, established a new union, and launched a farmworker movement. By 1977, the UFW held over 100 contracts, had recruited a dues-paying membership of more than 50,000, and had secured enactment of the 1975 California Agricultural Labor Relations Act, the only legislative guarantee of collective bargaining rights for agricultural workers in the continental United States. The UFW had also played a major role in the emergence of a Chicano movement in the Southwest, had recruited and trained hundreds of community activists, and had become a significant player in California politics. In this article, I ask why the newly formed, uncertainly funded, and independent United Farm Workers succeeded, while the well-established union with which it found itself in competition failed—the AFL-CIO's Agricultural Workers Organizing Committee (AWOC).[3]

Answering this question requires going beyond Jenkins and Perrow's (1977) classic of social movement theory, "Insurgency of the Powerless," which attributes the UFW's success, as compared with another effort in the late 1940s, to a more favorable political opportunity structure. Although the 1960s were an era of greater political responsiveness to groups like the UFW than the 1940s had been, this cannot explain why the UFW was more successful than its rival. Nor can scholars who rely on differences in resources to account for differences in outcomes (McCarthy and Zald 1977) explain why the resource-poor UFW succeeded while its resource-rich opponents did not. Those who attribute the UFW's success to the "charismatic leadership" of Cesar Chavez (Nelson 1966; Dunne 1967; Mathiessen 1969) explain little of what that is, where it comes from, and why it works. And even those who acknowledge the unique effectiveness of the UFW's strategy (Brown 1972; Majka and Majka 1982; Jenkins 1985) do not explain why it was the UFW that developed this strategy

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tion in general, I use the designation "UFW," but when referring to it in a specific historical context, as I do in most of this article, I use the name that was used at the time.

[3] This article only deals with the period of competition between the UFW and the AWOC. Competition from the Teamsters began in 1966 and continued, off and on, until they withdrew in 1977. Elsewhere, I show that similar differences in strategic capacity account for UFW success vis-à-vis the Teamsters.

and not its competitor. Drawing evidence from this case and insights from organization theory, social psychology, and cognitive sociology, I argue that consigning the influence of leadership and organization on strategy to a "black box" has created a serious deficit in social movement theory. As shown in figure 1, I argue that difference in the outcomes of AWOC and UFW efforts can be explained by differences in their strategy—the targeting, timing, and tactics through which they mobilized and deployed resources. Differences in their strategy, however, and the likelihood it would be effective in achieving desired goals, were due to differences in leaders' access to salient information about the environment, heuristic use they made of this information, and their motivation—what I call their "strategic capacity." Differences in strategic capacity, in turn, were due to differences in leaders' life experience, networks, and repertoires of collective action and the deliberative processes, resource flows, and accountability structures of their organizations. Strategic capacity is greater if a leadership team includes insiders and outsiders, strong and weak network ties, and access to diverse, yet salient, repertoires of collective action and also if an organization conducts regular, open, authoritative deliberation, draws resources from multiple constituencies, and roots accountability in those constituencies. I explain the UFW's success over its rivals by differences in its strategy, account for differences in strategy by the way in which it was developed, and explain how it was developed in the interaction of leadership and organization with environment.

Analysis of this case offers a way to specify conditions under which one organization is more likely than another to develop strategy that is effective in achieving its goals. I do not focus on why one kind of tactic is more effective than another—a topic dealt with extensively in political, military, and management literature—but rather on why one organization is more likely to develop a series of effective tactics than another—its strategic capacity. Although strategic capacity, strategy, and outcomes are distinct links in a probabilistic causal chain, I argue greater capacity is likely to yield better strategy, and better strategy is likely to yield better outcomes. Differences in strategic capacity can explain how resourcefulness compensates for lack of resources when insurgent social movements overcome more powerful opponents. Differences in strategic capacity can also explain why some new organizations overcome the "liability of newness" (Stinchcombe 1965) to succeed in domains in which old organizations fail, suffering from a "liability of senescence." Because of more recent selection, organizational flexibility, and closer articulation with the environment, leaders of new organizations may have greater access to salient information about current environments, heuristic opportunity, and motivation than leaders of old organizations. Attention to strategic capacity also helps explain why reconfigurations of leadership and organization



FIG. 1.—Strategic process model

at certain "focal moments" (Morris 1993; Sewell 1996; Lofland 1996) can produce dramatic strategic change, including the emergence of a social movement.

METHODOLOGY

This case study compares a sequence of concurrent strategic choices made by the AWOC and the UFW at three critical junctures—their organizational foundings, the Delano Grape Strike, and the Schenley Boycott. Because it provides an opportunity to "control" for environment, this case allows us to bring full attention to differences in the actors and how they interacted with their environment. A case study with multiple points of comparison can be an especially useful way to discern the underlying mechanisms that may account for repeated differences in outcome (Campbell 1975).

Although differences in the outcomes of these efforts are obvious, the factors that influenced the outcomes must be independently observable to have explanatory value and a mechanism shown through which they operate (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). Drawing on archival data, interviews, and participant observation, I examine the differences in each organization's strategy and its influence on outcomes by comparing differences in targeting, timing, and tactics at three critical moments—at each of which the UFW achieved its goals more effectively than did the AWOC.

Having established a link between strategy and outcomes, I draw on organization theory, social psychology, and cognitive sociology—which have contributed to social movement theory in the past (McCarthy and Zald 1977; Gamson, Fireman, and Rytina 1982; Snow, Rochford, Worden, and Benford 1986)—to conduct a grounded analysis of my data to identify conditions that could account for such dramatic differences in strategy. Because strategy unfolds in the interaction of leaders, organizations, and environment, I focus on sites of this interaction. I compare leaders as to their biographies, sociocultural networks, and tactical repertoires, and organizations as to their deliberative arrangements, resource flows, and accountability structures. This comparison reveals starkly different patterns of leadership and organization with direct bearing on formulation of strategy. Probing to discern the mechanism by which these differences turned into strategy drew my attention to patterns in the kind of information to which leaders had access, their heuristic use of this information, and their motivation, which I now call strategic capacity.

The data on which this analysis is based is drawn from primary and secondary sources as well as my experience with the UFW from 1965 to 1981 as an organizer, organizing director, and national officer. This raises

a potential problem of bias based on my personal experiences, interests I may have in particular accounts of controversial events, and personal relationships with persons on all sides of the conflict. But my experience also equips me with a deep understanding of the context of these events, direct information as to what took place, and access to important research resources. In an attempt to realize the benefits while minimizing the risks, I "triangulate" my data for this study by drawing on multiple primary and secondary sources, relying on my own experience only where specifically noted. Primary sources include interviews with participants; newspaper accounts, including those published by labor journals; published memoirs of participants; archival materials, including published proceedings of meetings; and my own notes and personal records. Secondary sources include histories of farm labor organizing; scholarly and journalistic accounts of the activities of the AWOC, the UFW, and the Teamsters; and unpublished doctoral dissertations.

Rather than attempting to test the influence of a single variable, the purpose of this project is to generate a grounded, yet theoretically informed, hypothesis to account for the observed differences in outcomes—and which can be further tested in other settings (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Liphart 1971; Skocpol 1984; Little 1991; Parry 1998). Because I develop a model to explain outcomes based on the interaction of a complex set of variables, my approach raises a problem of overdetermination or how to distinguish what actually "caused" what. I do not claim to have found a "crucial" variable necessary or sufficient to account for the differences in observed outcomes. Rather, I argue the outcome I explain—one group repeatedly develops more effective strategy than another—is more or less likely to the extent conditions specified in this model are met. In poker, chance may determine the outcome of any one hand, or even a game, but, in the long run, some players are more likely to be winners than others. An organization can always stumble on an opportunity, but I argue the likelihood it will make strategic use of it depends on factors I specify here. In this way, I explain the UFW's success compared with its rival by the greater effectiveness of its strategy, account for difference in the effectiveness of its strategy by the way it was developed, and explain the way it was developed by the interaction of leadership and organization with environment.

THEORY

Strategy and Social Movements

Social movement scholars tell us little about the relationship of strategic leadership to social movement success. Explanations of the emergence, development, and outcomes of social movements are usually based on

variation in resources, opportunities, and framing (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald 1996)—concepts that stress the influence of environmental change on actors. In this view, social movements unfold as actors predictably respond to new political opportunities, newly available resources, or changes in cultural frames. Although students of tactics do offer accounts of their sources (Tilly 1981; Freeman 1979) and their effect on outcomes (Lipsky 1968; Gamson 1975; McAdam 1983), they do not explain why one organization should devise tactics that turn out to be more or less strategically effective than those of another. Even in domains of management, military, and political studies in which strategic leadership receives far greater attention, the focus has been more on how leadership and strategy work than on explaining why some organizations devise more effective strategy than others.

Understanding social movements, however, requires accounting for the fact that different actors act in different ways, some of which influence the environment more than others. Some see political opportunities where others do not, mobilize resources in ways others do not, and frame their causes in ways others do not. And because it is based on the innovative, often guileful, exercise of agency, good strategy is often anything but obvious. It can thus be hard to deduce from "objective" configurations of resources and opportunities and is based rather on novel assessments of them (Morris 1984; Gamson and Meyer 1996; Jasper 1997). As a consequence, popular accounts of effective strategy attribute it to the charismatic gifts of particular leaders rather than offering systematic explanations of conditions under which leaders are more or less likely to devise effective strategy.

But neither is strategy purely subjective. Strategic thinking is reflexive and imaginative, based on how leaders have learned to reflect on the past, pay attention to the present, and anticipate the future (Bruner 1990). Leaders are influenced by life experience, relationships, and practical learning, which provide them with lenses through which they see the world (Bandura 1989; Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Banaszak 1996; Zerubavel 1997; DiMaggio 1997), and by the organizational structures within which they work and through which they interact with their environment (Weick 1979).[4]

Failure to bring attention to the important influence of strategic leader-

[4] Sociologists have begun to describe this approach as a "cognitive sociology," which they distinguish from "cognitive universalism"—in which actors are assumed to react similarly to similar environmental stimuli—and "cognitive individualism"—in which actors are assumed to react entirely idiosyncratically (Zerubavel 1997). This distinction is similar to that which social psychologists make between "mechanistic agency," "autonomous agency," and "emergent interactive agency" (Bandura 1989).

ship on social movements is an important theoretical shortcoming in general—and in scholarly efforts to explain the farmworker movement in particular. Students of the farmworker movement who focus on the changing environment or political opportunity structure correctly point to the importance of an emergent liberal coalition (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Jenkins 1985) and new politics of race (Majka and Majka 1982) but do not explain why the UFW took advantage of these opportunities in ways its competitors did not. Scholars who rely on differences in resources to account for success and failure (Jenkins and Perrow 1977; Jenkins 1985) cannot explain why the resource-rich AWOC failed, while the resource-poor UFW succeeded. Scholars who point to the UFW's strategy of redefining the arena of conflict by mobilizing dual constituencies of farmworkers and supporters, so they could "turn the moral tables" on the opposition with a grape boycott (Brown 1972; Majka and Majka 1982; Jenkins 1985), fail to explain why only the UFW devised this strategy. And observers who attribute the UFW's success to the charismatic leadership of Cesar Chavez (Nelson 1966; Dunne 1967; Mathiessen 1969) fail to explain what it is, where it came from, and how it worked.

Understanding Strategy

Strategy is the conceptual link we make between the places, the times and ways we mobilize and deploy our resources, and the goals we hope to achieve (Clausewitz 1832; Hamel and Prahalad 1989; Porter 1996; Eisenhardt and Brown 1998). Strategy is how we turn what we have into what we need—by translating our resources into the power to achieve purpose. Although we often do not act "rationally" and outcomes are often unintended (Cohen, March, and Olsen 1972; Salancik and Pfeffer 1977), we do act purposefully (Weick 1979; Watson 1990). Strategy is effective when we realize our goals by means of it. Studying strategy is a way of discerning pattern in the relationship between intention, action, and outcome.

Strategy is a way of "framing" specific choices about targeting, timing, and tactics. As schema theory teaches us, we attribute meaning to specific events by locating them within broader frameworks of understanding (Goffman 1974; Snow et al. 1986; Fiske and Taylor 1991; Gamson 1992; D'Andrade 1992; Gamson and Meyer 1996; DiMaggio 1997). The strategic significance of choices we make about how to target our resources, time our initiatives, and employ tactics depends on how we frame them in relation to other choices in a path toward our goals (Watson 1990). One reason it is difficult to study strategy is that, although choices about targeting, timing, and tactics can be directly observed, the strategic "frame" within which we make these choices—and provide them with their coherence—must often be inferred.

Since strategy is a way of orienting *current* action toward future goals, however, it develops in interaction with an ever-changing environment, especially the actions and reactions of other actors (Alinsky 1971; Weick 1979; J. B. Quinn 1980; Mintzberg 1987; Burgelman 1991; Mintzberg 1994; Hamel 1996; Brown and Einsenhardt 1997). In fixed contexts in which rules, resources, and interests are given, strategy can to some extent be understood in the analytic terms of game theory (Schelling 1960). But in settings in which rules, resources, and interests are emergent—such as social movements—strategy has far more in common with creative thinking (Morris 1984; Hamel 1996; Brown and Eisenhardt 1998). Strategic thinking in these settings can best be understood as an ongoing creative or innovative process of understanding and adapting new conditions to one's goals (Brown and Eisenhardt 1998).

My argument about the relationship of strategy to outcomes can be clarified by drawing on the distinction game theorists make between games of chance, skill, and strategy (Schelling 1960). In games of chance, winning depends on the luck of the draw. In games of skill, it depends on behavioral facility, like hitting a tennis ball. In games of strategy, it depends on cognitive discernment—in interaction with other players—of the best course of action, as in Go. In most games, all three elements come into play. In poker, for example, getting cards is a matter of chance; estimating probabilities, of skill; and betting, of strategy. Although chance may be dispositive in any one hand, or even one game, in the long run, skill and strategy distinguish excellent players—and their winnings—from others. Similarly, environmental developments can be seen as "chance," in so far as any one actor is concerned. But, in the long run, some actors are more likely to achieve their goals than others because they are better able to take advantage of these chances. Environmental changes may generate opportunities for social movements to emerge, but the outcomes and legacies of such movements have far more to do with strategies actors devise to turn these opportunities to their purposes—thus reshaping their environment.

Strategic Capacity

Organizations differ in the likelihood they will develop effective strategy—what I call their "strategic capacity." Viewing strategy as a kind of creative or innovative thinking, I build on the work of social psychologists, cognitive sociologists, and organization theorists by focusing on three key influences on creative output: salient knowledge, heuristic processes, and motivation (Amabile 1996).[5] In this section, I link leadership and organiza-

[5] I am particularly indebted to Amabile's fine work on creativity, which provided me with an important link between the microbehaviors and macro-outcomes I am trying

tional variables with these elements to specify conditions under which one group is likely to develop more effective strategy than another (see table 1, below).

Salient knowledge.—When actors face routine problems, their familiarity with domain-specific algorithms—or action repertoires—facilitates effective problem solving. The better one's information about a domain within which one is working, the better the "local" knowledge, the more likely one is to know how to deal effectively with problems that arise within that domain. Since environments change in response to actors' initiatives, however, regular feedback is especially important in evaluating responses to these initiatives (Zaltman, Duncan, and Holbeck 1973). The test of salience I use is one of relevance to the environment in which leaders are trying to get results, or their "operating environment."

Heuristic processes.—When faced with novel problems—often the case for leaders of organizations operating within new or changing environments—heuristic processes permit actors to use salient knowledge to devise novel solutions by imaginatively recontextualizing their understanding of the data.[6] This reframes understanding of the data so as to make alternative interpretations and pathways conceivable, facilitating analogic thinking (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Gentner 1989; Abelson 1981; White 1992; Strang and Meyer 1994) and bricolage (Lévi-Strauss 1966; Douglas 1986; Campbell 1997). At the most basic level, the more different ideas are generated, the greater the likelihood there will be good ones among them (Campbell 1960; Simonton 1988). Encounters with diverse points of view and ways of doing things thus facilitate innovation (Kasperson 1978), whether based upon one's life experience (Bernstein 1975; Langer 1989; Rosaldo 1989; Piore 1995) or the experience of a group (Weick 1979; Senge 1990; Rogers 1995; DiMaggio 1997). Knowledge of diverse domains not only offers multiple routines from which to choose,

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to explain. In adapting her work, I substitute the term "salient knowledge" for "domain specific skills" to better capture the crucial role of environmental information in strategy. I also focus on "recontextualization" as a key heuristic element in strategic thinking and consider a broader range of motivational sources. Although much of the scholarly work on creativity has been done at the individual level, studies of team and organizational innovation suggest enough similarity to use these studies as a starting point for looking at how leadership teams interact adaptively with each other and their environments to formulate strategy (Boone, van Olffen, and van Witteloostuijn 1998; Hutchins 1991).

[6] These processes also include "breaking set" during problem solving (Newell, Shaw, and Simon 1962), understanding complexity (E. Quinn 1980), keeping response options open (Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976), suspending judgment (Osborn 1963; Stein 1975), using wide categories (Cropley 1990; Bernstein 1975), breaking out of "scripts" (Langer 1978; Langer and Imber 1979), brainstorming (Osborn 1963), and playfulness with ideas (Wickelgren 1979; March and Olsen 1976).

TABLE 1

THREE ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC CAPACITY

	Motivation	Salient Information	Heuristic Processes
Dimensions of leadership:			
Biography (insiders and outsiders)	Personal, vocational commitment Intrinsic rewards	Diverse local knowledge	Broad contextualization
Networks (strong and weak ties)	Personal commitment Reputation	Diverse local knowledge Feedback	Broad contextualization
Repertoires (diverse salient repertoires)	Competence Feedback	Diverse local knowledge	Sources of bricolage or analogy
Organization:			
Deliberation (regular, open, and authoritative)	Commitment Autonomy	Diverse local knowledge	Heterogeneous perspectives Periodic assessment
Resource flows (multiple constituencies; reliance on people)	Commitment Autonomy Feedback	Feedback	Heterogeneous alternatives
Accountability (salient constituencies; entrepreneurial or democratic	Commitment Intrinsic rewards Feedback	Diverse local knowledge Feedback	Heuristic skills

NOTE.—The illustrated influences of leadership and organization on motivation, heuristics, and information are meant to be simultaneous, not sequential.

but contributes to "mindfulness" (Langer 1989) that multiple solutions are possible (Bernstein 1975; Langer 1989; Senge 1990; DiMaggio 1997) and that most known solutions are "equivocal" (Weick 1979).

Motivation.—Motivation is critical to creative output because of its effect on the focus actors bring to their work (Ruscio, Whitney, and Amabile 1995), their ability to concentrate for extended periods of time (Prentky 1980), their persistence (Walberg 1971), their willingness to take risks (Glover and Sautter 1977), and their ability to sustain high energy (Bergman 1979). Motivated actors are also more likely to do the work it takes to acquire needed domain-specific knowledge and skills than those who are less motivated (Conti, Amabile, and Pollack 1995). Perhaps the most important source of creative motivation is the "intrinsic reward" it brings to actors who love their work—for whom it is their "vocation"—in contrast with those motivated by "extrinsic rewards," which can actually inhibit creativity (Amabile 1996). Actors can also override "programmed" modes of thought to think more critically and reflexively (DiMaggio 1997) if they are intensely interested in a problem (Abelson 1981), dissatisfied with the status quo (Bourdieu 1990), or experience a schema failure as a result of sharp breaches in expectations and outcomes (Moscovici 1984; Garfinkel 1967; Swidler 1986). The influence of motivation on outcomes also helps explain the positive effect of affective or normative commitment on workplace performance (Mowday, Porter, and Steers 1982; Meyer and Allen 1997). Finally, one reason successful leadership teams can become more successful over time is that success augments motivation (Deci and Ryan 1980; Chong 1991), not only resources and opportunities. Organizational settings in which people enjoy autonomy, receive positive feedback from peers and superiors, and are part of a team competing with other teams enhance their motivation. It is diminished when they enjoy little autonomy, get no feedback or negative feedback from peers and superiors, and are competitive within a team (Amabile 1988; Hackman 1990).

Sources of Strategic Capacity

As illustrated in table 1 and explained in the text below, I argue that leadership variables of biography, networks, and repertoires, and organizational variables of deliberation, resource flows, and accountability, link in specific ways to each of the above three elements of an organization's "strategic capacity."

Leadership.—To identify sources of variation in strategic capacity, I compare the leaders of the AWOC and the UFW as to their biographies, sociocultural networks, and tactical repertoires—who they were, whom they knew, and what they knew. I define leaders as persons authorized to make strategic choices within an organization (Oberschall 1973; Porter

1996). I do not evaluate their qualities of leadership as such but rather their contribution to formulation of strategy. Although researchers have linked leaders' psychological, professional, organizational, and generational backgrounds to strategies they adopt, few have studied the relationship between leaders' backgrounds and the likelihood they will develop *effective* strategy (Mannheim 1952; Kuhn 1962; Oberschall 1973; Chandler 1977; Freeman 1979; Ross 1983; Lofland 1996).

Although strategy is more often described as the work of individual leaders than of formal or informal leadership teams, I argue that strategy is usually a product of the interaction among those persons who share responsibility for its formulation—what I call here a "leadership team." I recognize that the "person in charge" plays a uniquely important role in formulating strategy, particularly in the formation and maintenance of the leadership team itself (Hackman and Walton 1986). But I argue that strategy is more often the result of interaction among leaders than organizational myths acknowledge. I argue that leadership teams that combine insiders and outsiders, strong and weak ties to constituencies, and diverse yet salient repertoires of collective action have greater capacity to develop effective strategy than those that do not.

Because biographical experience is the primary source of a person's cognitive socialization (Bernstein 1975; DiMaggio 1997; Zerubavel 1997), cultural perspective (Rosaldo 1989; Jasper 1997), and motivating interests (D'Andrade 1992), I first analyze leaders' biographies as to race, class, gender, generation, ethnicity, religious beliefs, family background, education, and professional training.[7] As shown in the first row of table 1, I argue that leadership teams of "insiders" and "outsiders" combine diversity of salient local knowledge with an opportunity to heuristically recontextualize this knowledge (Bernstein 1975; Weick 1979; Senge 1990; Rogers 1995; Hamel 1996). Persons with "borderland" experience of straddling cultural or institutional worlds may make innovative contributions for the same reasons (Campbell 1960; Kuhn 1962; Rickards and Freedman 1978; Weick 1979; Rosaldo 1989; Piore 1995). Insiders personally committed to constituencies with whom they identify or outsiders normatively committed to a vocation are likely to be more motivated than those whose interest is solely instrumental or professional (Weick 1979; Howell 1990; Meyer and Allen 1997)—and they are more likely to find their work intrinsically rewarding (Amabile 1996).

As shown in the second row of table 1, teams that combine leaders with "strong" and "weak" ties will have greater strategic capacity than those that do not. Sociocultural networks (White 1992; Emirbayer and Goodwin

[7] One of the few social movement studies linking leadership with strategy is Wickham-Crowley's (1992) excellent comparison of Latin American guerrilla insurrections.

1994) are sources of ideas about what to do and how to do it (Granovetter 1973), mechanisms through which social movements recruit (Stark and Bainbridge 1985; McAdam and Paulsen 1993), sources of social capital (Coleman 1990; Putnam 1993; Chong 1991), and incubators of new collective identities (Taylor and Whittier 1992; Gamson 1991). Leaders with "strong ties" to constituencies are more likely to possess salient information about where to find resources, whom to recruit, what tactics to use, and how to encourage these constituencies to identify with the organization (Morris 1984). On the other hand, leaders with "weak ties" to diverse constituencies are more likely to know how to access the diversity of people, ideas, and routines that facilitate broad alliances (Granovetter 1973). Combinations of strong and weak ties are associated with social movement recruitment because they link access with commitment (Gamson 1990), just as they are associated with innovation because they link information with influence (Rogers 1995). Informal and formal ties are also important means for feedback of salient information, especially on organizational initiatives. Diverse ties, like diverse life experience, facilitate heuristic "recontextualization" of strategic choices. Strong ties strengthen a leaders' motivation to the extent they have personal commitments to those whose lives are influenced by choices they make and from whom they acquire their reputations (Chong 1991).

Finally, as shown in row three, leaders with knowledge of a diversity of salient collective action repertoires are more likely to develop effective strategy than those without such knowledge (Hamel 1996; Moore 1995; Alexander 1998). Knowledge of collective action repertoires is valuable because of their practical (people know what to do), normative (people think they are right), and institutional (they attach to resources) utility in mobilizing people who are familiar with them (Tilly 1986; Clemens 1996). Repertoires known to one's constituency, but not to one's opposition, are particularly useful (Alinsky 1971). Knowledge of multiple repertoires not only widens leaders' range of possible choices, but also affords them the opportunity to adapt to new situations by heuristic processes of bricolage or analogy. The motivation of leaders adept in these repertoires is enhanced by competence they experience in their use and by positive feedback from constituencies who find these repertoires familiar.

Organization.—Turning to the second major set of influences on strategic capacity, I argue that organizational structures that afford leaders venues for regular, open, and authoritative deliberation; draw resources from a diversity of salient constituencies; and hold leaders accountable to those constituencies—and to each other—are more likely to generate effective strategy than those that do not. Organizational structure is created by commitments among founders who enact ways to interact with each other

and with their environment (Weick 1993). It defines patterns of legitimacy (Weber [1948] 1978; Powell and DiMaggio 1991), power (Emerson 1962; Pfeffer and Salancik 1978; Perrow 1986), and deliberation (March and Olsen 1976). Although organizational form is a consequence of founders' strategic choices (Child 1972; Oliver 1988; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990; Clemens 1996), once established, it has a profound influence on innovativeness (Zaltman et al. 1973; Damanpour 1991) and strategy (Bower 1970).

As shown in row 4, leaders who take part in regular, open, and authoritative deliberation gain access to salient information, participate in a heuristic process by means of which they learn to use this information, and are motivated by commitment to choices they participated in making and upon which they have the autonomy to act (Duncan 1973; Hackman 1990; Amabile 1996). Regular deliberation facilitates initiative by encouraging periodic assessment of the organization's activities (Brown and Eisenhardt 1997, 1998). Deliberation open to heterogeneous points of view enhances strategic capacity because "deviant" perspectives facilitate better decisions (Nemeth and Staw 1989), encourage innovation (McCleod 1992; Weil 1994), and develop group capacity to perform cognitive tasks more creatively and effectively (Hutchins 1991). Authoritative deliberation—in the sense that it results in actionable decisions—motivates actors both to participate in decisions and to implement that which was decided upon (Hackman 1990).[8]

As shown in row 5, organizations that mobilize resources from multiple constituencies enjoy greater strategic capacity than those that do not. First, leaders who must obtain resources from constituents must devise strategy to which constituents will respond (Chandler 1962; Mansbridge 1986). If membership dues are a major source of support, leaders learn to get members to pay dues. However, reliance on resources drawn primarily from outside the operating environment—even when those resources are internal to their organizations—may dampen leaders' motivation to devise effective strategy. As long as they attend to the politics that keep the bills paid, they can keep doing the same thing "wrong." At the same time, leaders who draw resources from multiple constituencies gain strategic flexibility because they enjoy the autonomy of greater room to maneuver (Powell 1988; Alexander 1998). Finally, a decision to rely more

[8] To the extent strategy is viewed as emergent and improvisational, as in "adhocracies" in which decision makers are implementers, the distinction between decision making and implementation is problematic (Mintzberg and McHugh 1985). Skilled strategists take advantage of the unexpected, turning it to their purposes, even as it alters their plans.

on people than on money encourages growth in strategic capacity when it encourages selection and development of more leaders who know how to strategize. The more strategists, the greater the flexibility with which an organization can pursue its objectives and the scale on which it can do so (Weick 1979). Leaders' choices as to constituencies from whom to mobilize resources thus strongly influence their subsequent strategy (Oliver and Marwell 1992).

Finally, as shown in row 6, accountability structures affect strategy by establishing routines for leadership selection and defining loci of responsiveness. Leaders accountable to those outside the operating environment may have been selected based on criteria that have little to do with knowledge of—or motivational connection with—constituencies within that environment. Leaders selected bureaucratically are more likely to possess skills and motivations compatible with bureaucratic success than with the creative work innovation requires. Leaders selected democratically are at least likely to have useful knowledge of the constituency that selected them and enough political skills to have been selected if that constituency is within one's operating environment. Entrepreneurial or self-selected leaders—in the sense that the undertaking is their initiative—are more likely to possess skills and intrinsic motivations associated with creative work (Chambers 1964; MacKinnon 1965; Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976). Although democratic and entrepreneurial leadership selections are in tension with one another, either may yield greater strategic capacity than bureaucratic leadership selection.

Liability of Senescence

It is a "given" of organization theory that the failure rate among new organizations is greater than that among old organizations—the "liability of newness" (Stinchcombe 1965; Freeman, Carroll, and Hannan 1983). At the same time, scholars describe processes of organizational inertia (Hannan and Freeman 1977) that inhibit adaptation by old organizations to new environments, opening "niches" within which new organizations emerge—a liability of aging (Aldrich and Auster 1986) or "senescence." Differences in strategic capacity may explain why some new organizations do survive and at the same time account for less adaptive behavior by older organizations. Leaders of new organizations may have more strategic capacity because they were recently selected, have more organizational flexibility, and work in closer articulation with the environment. Leaders of old organizations often were selected in the past, are constrained by institutionalized routines, and may have the resources that allow them to operate in counterproductive insulation from the environment.

Focal Moments

Finally, because of the profound influence of leadership and organization on strategy, the choices leaders make at "focal moments," which reconfigure leadership and organization themselves, can create dramatically new strategic possibilities, including conditions for the emergence of a social movement (Smelser 1962; Morris 1993; Lofland 1996; Sewell 1996). As I will show below, this is what took place with the UFW.

Summary

Returning to figure 1, this article argues that an organization is more likely to achieve positive outcomes if it develops effective strategy, and it is more likely to develop effective strategy if its leaders can access diverse sources of salient information, employ heuristic processes, and demonstrate deep motivation—their strategic capacity. Variation in strategic capacity, again, derives from differences in leaders' life experience, networks, and repertoires, and organizations' deliberative processes, resource flows, and accountability structures.

ORGANIZING CALIFORNIA'S *FACTORIES IN THE FIELD*

California's uniquely large-scale agricultural industry requires seasonal workers.[9] It has also tried to protect itself from seasonal demands those workers make when organized.[10] Growers solved this problem historically by employing workers who were politically, economically, and culturally disfranchised. Politically, their status as migrants, immigrants, or undocumented workers meant few farmworkers ever became voters. Economically, farmworkers were excluded from the 1935 National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), which conferred the right to organize on industrial workers. And culturally, the fact that farmworkers were most often recruited from communities of color placed them beyond the racially bounded concerns of many white Americans (Majka and Majka 1982). As a result, local law enforcement usually stood ready to crush strikes through intimidation,

[9] This brief account is drawn from a number of histories of California agriculture and agricultural workers, especially Jamieson (1975), McWilliams (1935), Mitchell (1959), Daniel (1981), London and Anderson (1970), and Meister and Loftis (1977).

[10] In 1964, on the eve of the Delano Grape Strike, the value of California farm products sold was $3.5 billion, 66% of which was sold by 7,000 farms. Just 7% of the farms farmed 78% of the 37,000,000 acres of agricultural land in the state or 33% of all farmland in the United States (U.S. Bureau of the Census 1968).

injunctions, jailings, and violence, while state and federal officials could be counted upon to find alternative, usually immigrant, sources of labor.

Despite these challenges, since the 1880s, farmworkers made repeated attempts to organize. When ethnic minorities took the initiative, they usually formed ethnic labor associations. Chinese (1880s), Japanese (1900s), Mexican (1920s), and Filipino (1930s) farmworkers all tried one version or another, some of which were more successful than others, but all of which ultimately failed to yield the desired protection. Union attempts, on the other hand, with the exception of CAIWU, were usually made when or where Anglos constituted a major proportion of the workforce—such as IWW and AFL attempts to organize "fruit tramps" around 1910, CIO and Teamster attempts to organize "Okies" in the 1930s, and the AFL's National Farm Labor Union (NFLU) organizing attempt in the 1940s. None of these efforts succeeded in making lasting improvements in the lives of the workers, in building a stable membership base, or in getting union contracts.

In 1959, the year the AWOC was chartered, some 350,000 workers were employed in California agriculture, of whom some 90,000 were braceros—Mexican nationals imported as harvest hands under treaty between the United States and Mexico since 1942 (Sosnick 1978). The bracero program was at risk because of lobbying by farmworker advocacy groups (Proceedings, National Sharecropper's Fund 1957; National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor 1967; Craig 1970; Meister and Loftis 1977; Mitchell 1979), diminished demand for braceros outside California due to mechanization of cotton and tomato harvesting (Craig 1970; Martin and North 1984), opposition by Midwestern farmers to "privileges" afforded California agriculture (Craig 1970; Martin and North 1984), and concerns about domestic unemployment following the 1958 recession (Carmines and Stimson 1989). In August, 1959, the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor was formed, and on Thanksgiving day, 1960, Edward R. Murrow aired a graphic documentary on migrant farmworkers titled *Harvest of Shame.*

For these and other reasons, AFL-CIO President George Meany chartered the AWOC in February 1959 and shortly thereafter allocated it an organizing budget of $250,000 a year (Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Mitchell 1979). Meany was influenced by the National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor, a citizen's group chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt with ties to church leaders, labor leaders, liberals, and Democratic politicians (IUD Bulletin 1959; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Mitchell 1979; Zieger 1987). Some labor leaders also believed that organizing agricultural workers could contribute to "curbing the political power of agribusiness" (Gorman 1959, p. 35) as "some of the most reactionary forces in the United States" (IUD Bulletin 1961, p. 15). Finally, because of their rivalry for leadership of the Federation, Meany hoped to avoid

giving the "organizing issue" to Walter Reuther, president of the United Autoworkers and vice president of the AFL-CIO (Meister and Loftis 1977; Mitchell 1979; Barnard 1983; Lichtenstein 1968).

Early in 1961, as the AWOC seemed to be making progress, the Teamsters also declared an interest in farmworker organizing, signing a nominal contract with a lettuce grower whom the AWOC had struck (Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Jenkins 1985; Daniel 1987).[11] Then, in 1962, during a hiatus in AWOC organizing, the independent National Farm Workers Association (NFWA), led by former community organizer Cesar Chavez, was founded and began organizing. By early 1966, however, it was the NFWA—not the AWOC or the Teamsters—that won the first genuine union contract in California agriculture. By 1970, as the United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC, AFL-CIO), this union had brought the entire California table grape industry under contract, unionized some 70,000 workers, and achieved clearer success than any farm labor organizing effort in U.S. history.

THE AWOC AND THE UFW, 1959–66

The following account compares choices made by AWOC and UFW leadership at three critical junctures: their organizational foundings (1959–65), the Delano Grape Strike (1965–66), and the Schenley Boycott (1966). After comparing their strategy—emphasizing differences in targeting, timing, and tactics—I contrast the leadership and organization of the two groups, demonstrating the difference in their strategic capacity.

Organizational Foundings, 1959–65

AWOC's strategy unfolded in two phases under two different directors. When chartered by the AFL-CIO in 1959, the AWOC was charged to organize farm workers to improve their wages, hours, and working conditions and support efforts to repeal the bracero program (Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977). AWOC's strategy was to mobilize the workers, motivate them to pressure their employers, and get contracts. Although the struggle over the bracero program unfolded in a national, political, and long-term arena, AWOC's primary organizing mission was local, work centered, and short term.

[11] The Teamsters had been expelled from the AFL-CIO for corruption in 1957 and were thus under no obligation to support the AWOC. They signed a food processing contract to include field workers to prevent AWOC's claims of a labor dispute from interfering with the employer's access to braceros—who did the field work but were excluded from the contract because they were braceros.

The AWOC targeted workers based less on characteristics of the workers themselves than on workplace settings they deemed favorable for organizing. Although it operated for five years, AWOC's timing was short term and focused on visible results, quickly achieved. Its principal tactics—organizing at early morning pickup sites—or "shape-ups"—for wage strikes, exercising insider political pressure, and recruiting through labor contractors—extended a familiar repertoire of conventional labor union tactics that had served in quite different historical settings.

In contrast, during a brief volunteer phase in 1961 when it operated without "professional" leadership and found itself dependent for resources on its constituency, AWOC's strategy changed, anticipating that of the UFW by more than a year. AWOC activists targeted workers most likely to provide a long-term organizational base, rather than those whose workplaces seemed to offer short-term advantages. They took a longer-term time perspective, and their tactics mobilized around the broad range of farmworker needs, not only their work situation. As is shown below, this strategic consistency, the variation observed within it, and its ineffectiveness can be explained by changes in AWOC's leadership, the structure of its organization, and how these influenced its strategic capacity.

During the first phase (1959–61), under the direction of Norman Smith, the AWOC targeted workers who gathered daily for early morning shape-ups because they were "easier" to organize (London and Anderson 1970; Jenkins 1985; Anderson 1996). These were mostly white single men, casual day laborers in very seasonal crops, a rapidly disappearing remnant of "dust bowlers" in an increasingly Mexican workforce (Metzler 1964; California Assembly Committee on Agriculture 1969; Villarejo 1997). AWOC's tactics were to conduct leafleting campaigns among these workers and to call strikes to raise wages. During its first 18 months, the AWOC led more than 150 strikes, some of which yielded temporary wage increases, but it failed to produce stable membership or a union contract (Meister and Loftis 1977; Jenkins 1985).

In early 1961, the AWOC shifted its tactics but continued targeting workers based on short-term political advantages and an "insider" political repertoire. AWOC leadership persuaded itself the new Democratic administration would enforce bans against use of braceros as strikebreakers (Taylor 1975). Targeting lettuce growers who were major users of braceros, the AWOC mobilized unemployed domestic workers to picket them, persuaded the few domestic workers employed there to walk out, claimed the existence of a strike, and called on Labor Secretary Goldberg to order the braceros out (London and Anderson 1970; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Anderson 1996). Despite costly contests in local courts, the effort met with initial success. It backfired, however, when organizers

used violence to create a threat to the safety of the braceros so the Mexican consul would insist on their withdrawal. AWOC leaders were jailed and ended up with fines and legal bills approaching $50,000, which the AFL-CIO had to pay. When AFL-CIO auditors checked the books, they also found inflated membership reports. This offense, combined with a general lack of results and the existence of jurisdictional issues within the AFL-CIO, was enough for Meany to fire AWOC Director Smith, close down the AWOC, and transfer its members to other unions (London and Anderson 1970; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977).

Significantly, however, during the nine months the AWOC was officially shut down—and a new leadership team emerged, operating within a different organizational structure—a new strategy also emerged based on mobilizing volunteer support among farmworkers, farmworker advocacy groups, and within the labor movement itself (Anderson 1961; London and Anderson 1970; Meister and Loftis 1977; Anderson 1996). Among farmworkers, AWOC volunteers targeted stable resident Mexican families, organizing them to create "area councils" around a number of community concerns including housing, health care, and so on. They convened farmworkers and supporters for a widely attended organizing conference in December 1961 and organized a very dramatic appeal at the national AFL-CIO meeting early in 1962. The ironic outcome was that the AFL-CIO refunded the AWOC—but also hired another "professional" director who returned to the old strategy.

The new director, A. C. Green, targeted labor contractors whom the AWOC could picket. Contractors were middlemen paid by growers to recruit workers, who often took advantage of their role as "brokers" to cheat workers and growers. When the picketing worked, contractors signed agreements making their workers AWOC members and deducted dues from the workers' pay. The intent was to produce immediate membership growth and, using contractors to control the labor supply, to get better terms from the growers. The membership grew, and the AWOC eventually signed 136 contractors (London and Anderson 1970; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Jenkins 1985). But there were hundreds more it could not sign up, the contractors had no control over what growers chose to pay, and workers learned an AWOC contract meant paying dues for nothing in return (London and Anderson 1970; Taylor 1975; Anderson 1996). The only positive, if unintended, result of the focus on contractors was that Green hired two Filipino labor organizers, including Larry Itliong, with ties to Filipino labor contractors or crew leaders. Filipino crew leaders had traditionally negotiated with growers on behalf of crews of skilled workers, serving as advocates as well as supervisors. The initiative of these crew leaders actually started the Delano Grape Strike

(see below). By September 1965, on the eve of the grape strike, the AWOC had spent over $1,000,000 and had failed to create a genuine membership base or to sign a single contract with a grower.

The FWA, by contrast, which began organizing in 1962, developed a strategy of organizing a community of workers, developing mutual benefits to strengthen it, and then putting pressure on the employers to get contracts (Nelson 1966; Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Padilla 1999). The FWA leadership believed a critical error farmworker organizers had made in the past was in trying to strike and organize at the same time, the most recent evidence of which was the AWOC debacle in Imperial Valley the previous year (Taylor 1975; Levy 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Hartmire 1996; Drake 1997). Unlike the AWOC, the NFWA saw its strategy unfolding in a community, statewide, and long-term arena.

The FWA targeted Mexican resident farmworker families who were the growing part of the workforce (Metzler 1964; California Assembly Committee on Agriculture 1969; Jenkins 1985). A major center of this workforce was in Delano, the heart of the table grape industry, which provided one of the longest periods of employment in California agriculture. The FWA's tactics were to build a statewide association, blending community organizing techniques with a mutual benefit society and an ethnic labor association. Its timing extended over the five-year period the leaders believed would be required before they would be ready to confront the growers (Taylor 1975; Levy 1975; Drake 1997; Padilla 1999). The organizing began in the spring of 1962 with a statewide house meeting drive in farmworker communities, leading to a fall founding convention of the Associacion de Campesinos or Farm Workers Association. "Association" was selected to avoid turning away workers with negative experiences in earlier unionization attempts or provoking a premature reaction from the growers. "Campesino" was descriptive of the Mexican peasantry, whose movement since the Revolution was evocative of land, dignity, and resistance (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Medina 1998; Padilla 1999).

Within three years, the FWA had established a small death benefit, a social service program, credit union, newspaper (*El Malcriado*), its own flag, small treasury ($1,700), two paid staff, 1,500 members, and a capacity to engage in rent strikes, small work stoppages, and the like (Taylor 1975). Although largely self-sufficient to this point, in the summer of 1965, before the strike began, the NFWA applied for an Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO) grant of $500,000 to develop a range of cooperative community services for farmworkers (Taylor 1975). As we will see below, by the time the grant was awarded, circumstances had changed so dramatically that the NFWA decided to turn it down.

I now show how variation in the composition of the leadership and the organizational structure of the AWOC and the UFW not only yielded the difference in strategy described above, but a sharp difference in the underlying capacity to develop effective strategy—a point which becomes increasingly clear as events unfold.

Leadership

Salient differences among the leaders, staff, and volunteers of the two efforts become quite clear upon review of table A1, in the appendix, which summarizes biographical data including name; age at the time participant undertook farmworker organizing; race or ethnicity; religion; regional background; position; family background; family status; education, work, and organizing experience; work commitment; network affiliation; and repertoires of collective action. Family status is distinguished as married (M), single (S), children (C), divorced (D), and whether the spouse was active in the organizing effort (A). Interest in organizing of farmworkers is distinguished as to whether it was professional (an assignment), vocational (a mission), or personal (about one's own life). The appendix offers brief life narratives for key actors.

AFL-CIO president George Meany, organizing director John Livingston, and AWOC directors Norman Smith and A. C. Green developed the AWOC strategy. All were white men, age 52 or over, with extensive union backgrounds and experience at "insider" politics. As table A1 shows, the men whom Meany and Livingston chose to lead the AWOC were of a generation of "union men" who valued "legitimate" ways to do union work and had little understanding of workers different from themselves or of a public whose support they would need. They had no biographical experience of the farmworker community, few sociocultural networks reaching beyond their milieu (much less into the farmworker community), and tactical repertoires learned by organizing people like themselves in circumstances far different from those they now faced. Smith, who had done no union organizing for 18 years, was chosen because of a relationship with Livingston going back to UAW organizing in Flint, Michigan, and because more likely candidates such as Ernesto Galarza (see below) or Clive Knowles were associated with rival international unions, neither of which Meany wanted to offend (Anderson 1996).

Among those who worked with the AWOC but remained outside the leadership circle, however, were the 17 organizers whom the AWOC hired, the farmworkers it was trying to organize, and community supporters. The life experience, networks, and tactical repertoires of many of these people—such as Father Tom McCullough, Henry Anderson, Dolores Huerta, Andy Arellano, Cipriano Delvo, Raul Aguilar, and Larry Itli-

ong—linked them not only to the farmworker community, but to religious, student, and liberal groups as well. Most were younger, many were Mexican American or Filipino, and a few were women. Dr. Ernesto Galarza, the Mexican academic who had worked with the NFLU since 1949, served as Smith's assistant for 6 months, until October 1959 when he resigned over jurisdictional concerns. His main role had been to instruct Smith and the organizers in how to document abuses of the bracero program, a mission he had pursued for the previous eight years (Anderson 1996). Since this staff was not party to AWOC decision making, however, no one making strategic choices had ties to the farmworker constituency or "local knowledge" of the conditions about which they were making choices. As a result, the organizing repertoires decision makers brought to this new situation constrained more than they enabled. The personal commitment motivating AWOC's leadership to find ways to make the effort successful was also very limited. Meany's commitment to the AWOC was minimal. His decisions about how much support to give were the result of political pressure from farmworker advocacy groups, their liberal allies, and his rival, Walter Reuther. For Livingston, Smith, and Green, organizing farmworkers was an assignment, not a mission.

The composition of the FWA leadership team was far different from that of the AWOC, combining insiders and outsiders, those with strong and weak ties, and a diversity of salient repertoires. The FWA strategy was developed by leaders who were Mexican and Mexican American men and women mostly under 35, whose lives were rooted in the farmworker community but extended well beyond it—such as Cesar Chavez, Dolores Huerta, and Gilbert Padilla. They worked in collaboration with two white clergymen affiliated with the California Migrant Ministry (CMM), Chris Hartmire and Jim Drake, both of whom were under 30 with middle-class backgrounds but who, as a result of their seminary experience, had come to share a vocation to improve the lives of farmworkers. FWA leaders thus drew on life experience that combined "local knowledge" of the farmworker world with experience in military service, college, small business, and professional organizing. The clergy brought "local knowledge" of religious groups and insight into the middle-class support constituency from which they themselves were drawn. Many of the leaders benefited from the insights of "borderland" experience as young Mexican Americans growing up in the 1940s. The leadership of the FWA also had a deep personal interest in finding ways to succeed at what was a personal mission. Not only had they come from farmworker backgrounds, they had given up secure jobs and other opportunities to risk building a new organization from the ground up. This combination of personal, vocational, and professional interests infused the effort with powerful motivation to develop a strategy that would make it work.

The range of sociocultural networks with which they were affiliated extended from the farmworker community into the worlds of community organizing, Mexican American activists, religious groups, and liberal circles throughout California. These networks combined strong ties to the farmworker community and the religious community with weak ties to many groups who would play important roles in the organizing (Granovetter 1973).

Finally, their tactical repertoire grew out of their experience and training as professional community organizers, particularly within the Spanish-speaking community. But they also drew on some union experience (Huerta and Chavez), Catholic retreat training (Chavez), and electoral experience (Chavez, Huerta, Padilla). The house meeting drive and founding convention used to kick off the FWA, for example, was a tactic adapted from numerous local Community Service Organization (CSO) organizing drives to statewide purposes.

Neither the AWOC nor the FWA "had to" pursue the strategies they did—a fact demonstrated in AWOC's case by the alternate approach taken by volunteers during the organizational hiatus. To learn why the experience of its leaders imposed "limits" on the effectiveness of its strategy—and why the experience of FWA leaders was such a fruitful source of strategy—we turn to the organizational setting within which strategy was developed.

Organization

While the FWA's deliberative structure was anchored in regular board meetings and inclusive strategy sessions, AWOC's deliberative structure provided no focal point for creative discussion. Within the AWOC, not only were there no advisory councils or farmworker committees, but staff meetings were irregular, lacked agendas, and were venues for announcements, not strategic reflection—especially after Galarza left. Either Director Smith or Director Green was in charge.[12] They decided what to do. The organizers' job was to do what they were told (Anderson 1961; London and Anderson 1970; Meister and Loftis 1977; Anderson 1996). This severely limited opportunity for diverse perspectives to be heard, for reflection, and for learning. In the FWA, on the other hand, regular board meetings and strategy sessions anchored a deliberative process, which included a far wider leadership group (including Drake and Hartmire) in

[12] Although members of the National Advisory Committee on Farm Labor shared responsibility for the formation of the AWOC—and were later to support the UFW—the AFL-CIO insulated them from any input into AWOC's strategy.

frequent discussion of the choices facing the organization (Nelson 1966; Hartmire 1996; Drake 1997).

Resources flowed from the top down within the AWOC, motivating the development of strategies that would satisfy those at the top, while the FWA's financial and human resources flowed upward, motivating the development of strategies that could yield the needed resources. For the AWOC, the main organizing resource was money to pay staff, cover organizing expenses, and maintain offices. The fact that dues were not a significant source of income meant there was limited motivation to create a financial base among workers. The AWOC also had little motivation to generate volunteer participation from farmworkers or supporters, relying on paid staff to do its work (Anderson 1961; London and Anderson 1970; Meister and Loftis 1977; Anderson 1996). The FWA's financial resources, on the other hand, were based on membership dues of $3.50/month per family, which were collected in cash by local representatives. Dues entitled member families to a small death benefit, social services, membership in the credit union, and a newspaper. Chavez's personal savings and individual contributions from supporters supplemented these resources. The UFW's human resources included one intermittently paid staff member (Chavez earned $50 a week), which grew to three staff members by 1965 (with the addition of Huerta and Bill Esher, newspaper editor). In addition, the CMM paid Padilla part time and offered the services of Drake and Hartmire as needed and available (Taylor 1975; Smith 1987; Hartmire 1996; Drake 1997; Padilla 1999). Most of the organization's work, however, was done on a volunteer basis by board members, representatives, and other activists—resting on maintenance of the extraordinary level of motivation that underlay the whole undertaking.

The accountability structure of the AWOC was based on a chain of command that precluded input from those below the top levels at which strategy was discussed, while that of the FWA was based on responsiveness to the farmworker community and to those doing the daily work of the organization. AWOC's bureaucratic command structure was viewed as the only source of strategic legitimacy within the organization (Anderson 1996). As an organizing committee of the AFL-CIO, Meany appointed its directors, on the recommendation of Livingston, and the directors, in turn, hired the staff who reported to them. There was no advisory board of supporters, accountability mechanism to farmworkers, or role for farmworker leadership within this chain of command (Anderson 1961; Anderson 1996). Not even Livingston was permitted to sit in on Executive Council settings in which Meany formulated strategy (Reuther 1976). The FWA, on the other hand, was built around a six-person executive board (Chavez, Huerta, Padilla, Orendain, Terronez, and Hernandez) elected by farmworker delegates at the founding convention. It was led by a full-time

president, part-time volunteer officers, and a network of appointed local representatives in each community (Taylor 1975; Padilla 1999). Chavez, Huerta, and the others had also "selected themselves" for this mission.

Strategic Capacity

Differences in deliberative processes, resource flows, and accountability structures interacted with differences in the composition of leadership teams to create far greater strategic capacity for the UFW than for the AWOC. AWOC's extremely narrow deliberative process limited the quality of leaders' thinking by excluding the diverse—and more salient—perspectives of others in and around the AWOC. The top-down resource flow meant not even AWOC directors had autonomy to develop strategy that assigned first priority to the mission of organizing farmworkers. This is illustrated when Meany shut down the AWOC in 1961 and assigned Green to do political work for the better part of 1962, his first year as AWOC director. The fact that AWOC's leadership was not accountable to farmworkers meant the concerns of Meany and Livingston would always carry the day. "Getting quick results" or "building up the membership numbers" had a far greater influence on Smith and Green than would have been the case if they had to deal with an organized farmworker constituency whose reactions they had to consider as well. Ironically, the top-down accountability structure and resource flows yielded little motivation to develop organizing strategies that could produce resources—financial resources through worker dues or contributions of supporters, or human resources such as volunteering by farmworkers and others. AWOC leaders had the resources to keep making the same mistakes, as long as the people at the top were satisfied.

FWA leadership, on the other hand, made the most of its capacity because of organizational arrangements it made. FWA's deliberative process assured extensive and diverse input. Inclusion of the clergy infused the conversation with input from those not in a direct chain of command and thus more likely to argue their own point of view. FWA leaders drew heavily—but not exclusively—on the farmworker community for both human and financial resources. Need for these resources motivated development of strategy that would successfully expand its membership and base. FWA's accountability structure also tied its leadership to those whose active support was needed if the enterprise was to succeed. Although it was based on election by a farmworker convention, on a day-to-day basis, as members of a "committed band," leaders were accountable to each other, including Chavez and the officers, through board meetings. The leaders were thus motivated to devise effective strategy and enjoyed the autonomy to act on strategy they devised—single-mindedly pursuing

a farmworker organizing agenda. This had the consequence that the FWA would make its allies uncomfortable from time to time but never find itself so dependent upon any one of them that a supporter's priorities would supplant its own (Levy 1975; Daniel 1987; Cohen 1995; Hartmire 1996; Chatfield 1996).

The contrast between AWOC and FWA leadership in terms of access to salient information, heuristic facility, and motivation could not have been greater. The diverse experience of FWA leadership, working in a productive organizational setting, allowed it to develop strategy more effectively than the AWOC. Although the AWOC had access to far richer leadership resources than it utilized, it structured itself to preclude their engagement in the development of strategy—which was developed by those least well equipped to do so. The differences in outcomes achieved by the two organizations during this founding period were more than the result of "mistakes" on the part of the AWOC and "brilliance" on the part of the UFW. As FWA leaders drew on their strategic capacity to devise the targeting, timing, and tactics with which it could achieve its goals, what emerged was something new: a combination ethnic labor association, mutual benefit society, and community organization. And, as we will see below, when these tactics did not work, the leaders had also developed the capacity to change.

The Delano Grape Strike, 1965–66

The following analysis of the Delano Grape Strike shows the value of accounting for outcomes not only in terms of a specific strategy, but in terms of an underlying, and developing, strategic capacity. Although the bracero program had finally been phased out in 1964, altering the organizing environment, a grape strike was not on the strategic agenda of either organization.[13] When it occurred, AWOC leadership viewed it as a short-term minor diversion from its major focus at the time, a joint campaign with the Teamsters to organize citrus workers in another part of the Valley (Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977). NFWA leadership on the other hand viewed it as a risky long-term diversion from their plan that had called for two more years of organizing without a major strike (Nelson 1966; Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Hartmire 1996; Drake 1997; Padilla 1999). The different ways leaders of these two organizations responded to this unanticipated, but "eventful" (Sewell 1996), "focal moment" (Lofland

[13] Many of the single men who had worked as braceros returned to the United States—but as legal immigrants were not barred from organizing. Their experience had convinced many to become strong UFW supporters in vegetable and citrus industries where they came to be employed.

1996) set the NFWA on the path to success and the AWOC on the path to dissolution.

Strategizing the Strike

The 1965 grape strike was the consequence of an initiative by AWOC organizer Itliong and Filipino crew leaders trying to raise wages of their Delano grape crews from $1.20/hour to $1.40/hour, the minimum wage that growers had been required to pay braceros. These crews comprised some 800 of the 3,500 grape workers in Delano, but they included the most skilled workers. Forced to respond, but not wanting to alienate the Filipino crew leaders unnecessarily, AWOC leadership agreed to support a strike for a wage increase to be quickly won or lost depending on whether Filipino grape workers who walked out stayed out. AWOC's tactics focused on providing meals for strikers, housing when needed, and a modest strike benefit. AWOC staff was personally unaffected, remaining on salary and expenses as before. The AWOC maintained stationary picket lines at the 10 companies that it had struck, mainly to keep its members occupied and to make sure none of them returned to work (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977).

Meanwhile, the leadership of the NFWA struggled to respond strategically to a strike called in its midst without its knowledge or consent. The Filipino strike had struck a nerve with the 2,500 Mexican workers, who had gone many years without a substantial wage increase and among whom the NFWA had several hundred members (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975). NFWA leadership had just concluded a minor but successful strike action of its own but was dubious of its capacity to manage a major sustained strike (Nelson 1966). On the other hand, sensing an opportunity and willing to take some risk, NFWA leaders decided to test support among Mexican workers by mobilizing them for a public strike-vote meeting (Taylor 1975; Nelson 1966; Drake 1997; Hartmire 1996; Padilla 1999). Drawing on Mexican tradition, the NFWA encouraged attendance—and a sense of courage and commitment—by meeting in the hall of Our Lady of Guadalupe Church in Delano, the religious center of the community, on September 16, Mexican Independence Day. NFWA leaders had decided to risk leading a strike if the turnout were substantial and the workers would agree to three strategic conditions—conditions that indicated how the NFWA had already begun to redefine its strategy (Nelson 1966; Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Hartmire 1996; Drake 1997).

First, unlike the AWOC, the NFWA had no strike fund and could not offer strike support, so everyone would have to share the risk. Although this was not a viable option for the AWOC because of the isolation of the leadership from its constituency, it was for the NFWA because of the

social capital it had built among the workers, the level of commitment among the leadership, and the confidence it had developed in learning how to survive by relying on volunteer resources (Taylor 1975).

The second condition was that the strike would be nonviolent. This was new to the farmworker community and to agricultural strikes in general. Although Chavez had long been interested in Gandhi, reframing the strike as a "nonviolent struggle" would also help the NFWA find support to sustain it from church groups and others with whom it already had relationships (Hartmire 1996). The value of identification with the Civil Rights movement had become clear in a rent strike the UFW led earlier in the summer and that came to the attention of California civil rights groups who supported it (Chatfield 1996; Padilla 1999). Just five months earlier, the whole country had observed the impact of Dr. King's Selma to Montgomery March and just five weeks earlier that of the Watts Riot.

Third, the strike would be for union recognition, not only for the wage increase the AWOC was seeking (Taylor 1975). This framed the strike in terms that would remind unions and others, particularly the churches, that farmworkers remained outside the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), had to strike for recognition, and therefore were deserving of their support.

The 1,200 enthusiastic Mexican workers who attended the meeting voted overwhelmingly to accept these conditions and to go on strike (Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Levy 1975; Medina 1998; Padilla 1999). This was the beginning of the grape strike that unfolded less as a minor labor dispute (which it was for the AWOC) and more as the first step in the birth of a farmworkers movement (which it was for the NFWA).

The Strike Unfolds: Strategic Choices

As the strike unfolded over the next few weeks, NFWA leadership drew on its strategic capacity to adapt successfully to new challenges with a new urgency of timing and with new tactics. These choices, in turn, began to reshape the contours of the organization itself and its leadership in ways that deepened the strategic capacity on which it could draw to face subsequent challenges. The extent of the strategic reframing, which had already occurred, became clear as early as October 1965 when the NFWA got the news it had been awarded $270,000 of the OEO grant it had applied for and turned it down. The NFWA would not abandon its role in the strike, as receiving the government funds would have required (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Chatfield 1996). AWOC leadership, on the other hand, drawing on very limited strategic capacity—but more abundant material resources—grew increasingly isolated from its own strike leaders and al-

lies as time passed (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975). The different choices NFWA and AWOC leaders made in dealing with the same situation show the influence differences in the leadership and organization of the two groups had on their capacity to devise effective strategy.

While the AWOC limited the effectiveness of its strikers by assigning them to picket only farms on which they had been employed, the NFWA learned how to lead a strike of 2,500 workers with just 200 pickets. Since the AWOC hoped to win the strike by keeping its own members from returning to work, it established "stationary picket lines" outside the vineyards in which they had worked, mainly to keep them occupied and vigilant (Nelson 1966). On the first morning the NFWA joined the strike, however, only 100 to 200 activists reported to begin picketing. Realizing an effective strike would require the participation of many more workers than these 200, the NFWA devised the "roving picket lines" tactic (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Drake 1997). Car caravans of pickets arrived at grape fields waving flags and banners, called the workers out of the fields, and then moved on to the next location. Although 2,500 of the 3,500 Delano grape workers eventually joined the strike and refused to go to work, most left the area to find work elsewhere rather than joining the picket lines (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977). With the "roving picket line," a relatively small core of NFWA activists could sustain the strike longer—and with less money—than anyone expected. They became the core of a full-time activist cadre, many of whom would become organizers (Brown 1972). The AWOC rejected NFWA proposals for joint strike committees or picket lines, leaving the NFWA free to develop its own tactics (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Drake 1997; Padilla 1999).

Unlike the AWOC, the NFWA had to generate its own strike fund, so it learned to use its networks to begin mobilizing public support. Hartmire recruited clergy delegations to come to Delano, to see the conditions "first hand," and to return home to raise food and money (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Hartmire 1996; Drake 1997). Civil rights groups such as the Bay Area Friends of Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee (SNCC) mobilized food caravans to Delano (Taylor 1975). A fund-raising speech by Chavez at the University of California, Berkeley, not only netted $6,000, but encouraged students to volunteer in Delano as well (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975). In contrast, the AWOC rejected all offers of "outside" support, except those coming through "legitimate" labor channels. The AWOC also rejected the NFWA's proposal to create a joint strike fund (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Padilla 1999). Although AWOC leadership did not think it needed "outside" support, this decision isolated it from a public that had become increasingly interested in the strike (Taylor 1975).

The NFWA learned to turn local injunctions intended to cripple effective picketing into opportunities for civil disobedience, which would gen-

erate wider public support for the strike. The AWOC relied on the advice of its AFL-CIO lawyers to avoid costly legal entanglements (Taylor 1975). The NFWA, in contrast, based its response on the advice of volunteer civil rights lawyers, a far wider tactical repertoire, and greater willingness to take risks. As grower recruitment of strike breakers from outside the area grew more effective, workers no sooner left the fields than others would take their places, requiring the NFWA to encourage them to leave as well. When the local sheriff barred strikers from shouting "huelga" (Spanish for strike) to workers in the fields, the NFWA planned a well-publicized arrest of 44 persons for exercising "free speech" (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Drake 1997). The fact that 11 clergymen were among those arrested evoked similar scenes of civil disobedience in the South. Similar tactics kept the strike in public view, helping to generate the resources to sustain it (Taylor 1975). One result of growing public attention was a December 1965 visit to Delano by Walter Reuther who pledged $5,000 per month in support to the strike. Significantly, after intensive lobbying by NFWA supporters, Reuther split the money between the AWOC and the NFWA, giving the independent NFWA the first substantial labor support it had received (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Schrade 1984; Chatfield 1996; Drake 1997). This was a rebuke to AWOC leadership and a sign some labor leaders were taking another look at the Delano strike, particularly those critical of Meany's leadership of the Federation. It also showed the NFWA had learned to see "opportunity" in the conflict between Reuther and Meany that it could turn to its advantage.

Ethnic identity had been central to the NFWA organizing strategy since its founding convention, in sharp contrast to the AWOC (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975). While there were solidaristic benefits to this approach among its membership, it was also a way the NFWA could reach out to farmworkers who knew less about the benefits it offered but understood that it was an effort of the "Mexican people" to help themselves (Medina 1998). The rich Mexican cultural tradition also provided "moral resources" strikers drew upon to sustain their motivation. Roman Catholic masses celebrated by "huelga priests" affirmed values of sacrifice and solidarity. Traditions of mutuality among extended families modeled the mutuality at the core of the striker community, and Mexican history came alive as slogans appeared on walls that read: Viva Juarez! Viva Zapata! Viva Chavez!

But it also had benefits in the country as a whole. The systematic discrimination to which Mexicans had been subjected in the Southwest was a story not well known by the rest of the country, but the NFWA leadership's recognition of the public support developed by the Civil Rights movement suggested this might be a story that the rest of the country

could be told. It would help explain the dire circumstances in which farmworkers had come to live, while distinguishing the farmworker struggle from "just another strike" and the NFWA from "just another union" (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Hartmire 1996). It would also draw support of urban Mexican Americans. Although public support for civil rights offered farmworker organizers a new opportunity, it was not an opportunity AWOC leadership recognized. Trapped within a reality defined by its own leadership and organizational structure, it insisted on its identity as "just another union" and the grape strike as "just another strike" (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975).

Strategic Capacity

The development of a "strike community" was the most far-reaching consequence of the choices NFWA leaders made about how to conduct the strike under severe financial constraints. By transforming the organization and its leadership, this increased its access to salient information, enriched its heuristic facility, and deepened its motivation—and created a critical core for the emergence of a social movement (Kim and Bearman 1997). The AWOC, on the other hand, relying on AFL-CIO financial support adequate for its limited objectives, saw no need to change. To retain the support of the strikers, NFWA leaders believed they had to share the strikers' level of sacrifice, which meant strike benefits of $1.00 per week (later $5.00 per week) and food orders from a strike "store" (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975). Because of their depth of personal commitment, NFWA officers moved to Delano, became full-time volunteers, and supported themselves as strikers—which, in turn, deepened their commitment to winning the strike and made it easier for them to claim similar levels of commitment from others (Brown 1972). There were three important consequences to this choice.

First, because the cost per person was so low (food, a bed, $1.00 per week), the NFWA could relatively easily add full-time volunteers, and it began accepting students and religious activists who came to Delano to join the strike on the same terms (Nelson 1966). By enabling large numbers of people to volunteer, the NFWA developed a new talent pool on which it could draw for the myriad new responsibilities that had begun to emerge. Expansion of this cadre—for which the roving picket line had served as a core—made it possible for the NFWA to field large numbers of full-time "troops" for strike, boycott, and political activities.

Second, in a setting as "open" as the NFWA, bringing in new people facilitated the emergence of new leadership that, in turn, expanded, enriched, and altered the composition of the original NFWA leadership group, in ways that further enhanced its strategic capacity. As shown in

table A1 below, the volunteers included young farmworker leaders who emerged from striking families such as Eliseo Medina, Marcos Munoz, and Maria Saludado. They would serve as picket captains, organizers, boycott organizers, and some later rose to leadership positions in the union. Of some 40 boycott cities operating at the peak of the grape boycott, some 35 were led by new farmworker leaders (Brown 1972). Another source of people was students who had been involved in the Civil Rights movement who came to Delano as volunteers. Individuals such as Luis Valdez, Jessica Govea, and I served in a wide variety of roles as organizers, boycotters, administrators, and so on (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Levy 1975; Mathiessen 1969). A third font of volunteers were religious activists, such as Leroy Chatfield, inspired by the Civil Rights movement, recruited by the CMM, or motivated by Vatican II (Hartmire 1996; Chatfield 1996; Drake 1997). Finally, talented young lawyers, such as Jerry Cohen, were attracted—drawn to public service but wishing to practice more "political" law than was possible through legal services corporations (Levy 1975; Cohen 1995; Chatfield 1996).

Third, these choices led to the emergence of a "charismatic community" based on "vows of voluntary poverty" that shared an almost religious commitment to winning the strike (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Daniel 1987). Amplified by solidaristic tactics needed to sustain this level of commitment, such as Chavez's 28-day fast in 1968, this community became a "crucible" of cultural change (Turner 1966; Gamson 1991; Taylor and Whittier 1992; Peterson 1999), which transformed farmworkers into "chavistas," supporters into "voluntarios," the grape strike into "La Causa," and Chavez into a legendary farmworker leader.[14] This cultural dynamic was to infuse the UFW with significance for farmworkers, Mexican Americans, students, religious activists, and liberal Americans far beyond its political reach as a community organization or ethnic labor association, beginning to give it the impact of a genuine social movement.[15]

Summary and Comparison

The foregoing shows how the NFWA and the AWOC made strategic choices about how to deal with a grape strike neither group had "planned."

[14] Under these circumstances, talented leaders may be transformed into a symbol of this "new" community of identity—the source of "charisma" (Weber 1978; Durkheim 1915; Meindl 1989). Charismatic effects attributed to the leader, such as attracting followers, enhancing their sense of self-esteem, and inspiring them with a willingness to exert extra effort, may be the result of a kind of social contagion (House, Spangler, and Woycke 1991; Hollander and Offerman 1990; Meindl 1989).

[15] The argument here is that social movements have a "symbolic reach" that extends their influence beyond those with whom it has direct personal interaction. "Cultural

The choices the NFWA made met its immediate needs but did so strategically—creating new opportunities for the organization to move toward its goals and at the same time expanding the access to salient information, heuristic opportunity, and motivation of its leadership. By December 1965, when the NFWA launched its first boycott, it had transformed its strategy. It saw itself not only as a community organization and ethnic labor association, but also as a farmworker civil rights movement. The choices the AWOC made also met its immediate needs but moved it in the opposite direction, toward isolation and dissolution.

The Schenley Boycott, 1966

As the harvest drew to a conclusion in November without wage increases or contracts with the growers, NFWA leaders had to face the new challenge of how to sustain a strike when there was no work—at least until pruning in January. Although NFWA strikers had followed grapes to produce terminals in Los Angeles and San Francisco since October, the main result had been injunctions against secondary picketing (Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977). Volunteer SNCC researchers, however, who had learned to investigate the financial connections of segregated institutions so they could be exposed and picketed in the North, began to investigate the growers. In December 1965, they discovered that Schenley Industries, which owned 5,000 acres of wine grapes in Delano, was a major liquor producer and distributor who marketed such well-known brands as Cutty Sark scotch whiskey (Taylor 1975; Drake 1997).[16] Targeting Schenley for a boycott became a new option. Deciding the NFWA needed to "try something," Chavez named Jim Drake of the CMM and Mike Miller, a San Francisco SNCC organizer, as co-coordinators of the boycott (*Boycott Newsletter* 1965; Drake 1997).

Timed to take advantage of the Christmas season and counting on support from religious, SNCC, Congress of Racial Equality (CORE), and Students for a Democratic Society (SDS) networks, the UFW dispatched a corps of student volunteers and strikers to major cities across the United

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reception" theorists (Griswold 1987) would argue the symbols or cultural objects a social movement generates (including a symbolic leader) and disseminates can be appropriated by people who begin to make use of them in their own ways.

[16] The significance of an environment conducive to strategic innovation—and the unpredictable way in which it often unfolds—is illustrated by the fact that the original impetus for research into Schenley was the rumor it was a Kennedy family investment. Although Joseph Kennedy had imported Cutty Sark during World War II, the rumor turned out to be false. It led, nevertheless, to consideration of the possibility of a boycott. March and Olsen (1976) note the importance of environments that permit whimsical paths to strategic innovation as employing the "technology of foolishness."

States to organize picket lines of liquor stores in communities likely to respond (Taylor 1975; Levy 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Drake 1997). Their tactics were drawn more from a civil rights repertoire than a labor repertoire—they conducted a secondary boycott, asking consumers not to shop at stores being picketed until the stores removed Schenley products from the shelves (Taylor 1975; Drake 1997).[7] Boycott organizers were also expected to raise operating costs in the cities in which they arrived, as the UFW could afford to send them no funds (Drake 1997). The AWOC was invited to take part in the boycott but declined because of legal concerns about NLRA prohibitions and because AFL-CIO Distillery Workers who represented Schenley winery workers vetoed labor support for the boycott (Taylor 1975; Levitt 1996).

Although there was an encouraging response from the public, the boycott wore on into January 1966 without visible result. While considering tactics to strengthen it, the leadership became concerned with how to keep workers from returning to Delano in the spring when work in the grapes resumed (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975). In a deliberative process to which the NFWA turned frequently when faced with critical choices, Chavez gathered a leadership group at a supporter's home in Santa Barbara to spend three days figuring out what to do. Besides Chavez, the strategy team included Huerta, Drake, Valdez, farmworkers Robert Bustos and Tony Mendez, myself, and others (Ganz 1994; Drake 1997). Perhaps the best way to give a sense of the creative process—and the interaction of people and ideas central to it—is to quote from my notes:

> As proposals flew around the room, someone suggested we follow the example of the New Mexico miners who had traveled to New York to set up a mining camp in front of the company headquarters on Wall Street. Farmworkers could travel to Schenley headquarters in New York, set up a labor camp out front, and maintain a vigil until Schenley signed. Someone else then suggested they go by bus so rallies could be held all across the country, local boycott committees organized, and publicity generated, building momentum for the arrival in New York. Then why not march instead of going by bus, someone else asked, as Dr. King had the previous year. But it's too far from Delano to New York, someone countered. On the other hand, the

[7] Boycotts had long been part of the standard union repertoire. In 1947, however, the Taft-Hartley Act made "secondary boycotts" illegal for organizations of workers covered by the NLRA. When unions ask consumers to shun buying anything in a store that sells struck products, it is a secondary boycott. The 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act extended the ban to the remaining "hot cargo" clauses, which had allowed union members to refuse to handle struck products; e.g., truck drivers, stevedores, supermarket employees. As a result, most union boycotts had become "pro forma" and usually only consisted of placing the boycotted product on an "unfair list" published in union newspapers (Miller 1961). Since 1956, however, the Montgomery Bus Boycott had revived it as an important tool of the Civil Rights movement.

> Schenley headquarters in San Francisco might not be too far—about 280 miles which an army veteran present calculated could be done at the rate of 15 miles a day or in about 20 days. . . . But what if Schenley doesn't respond, Chavez asked. Why not march to Sacramento instead and put the heat on Governor Brown to intervene and get negotiations started. He's up for re-election, wants the votes of our supporters, so perhaps we can have more impact if we use him as "leverage." Yes, someone else said, and on the way to Sacramento, the march could pass through most of the farmworker towns. Taking a page from Mao's "long march" we could organize local committees and get pledges not to break the strike signed. Yes, and we could also get them to feed us and house us. And just as Zapata wrote his "Plan de Ayala," Luis Valdez suggested, we can write a "Plan de Delano," read it in each town, ask local farmworkers to sign it and to carry it to the next town. Then, Chavez asked, why should it be a "march" at all? It will be Lent soon, a time for reflection, for penance, for asking forgiveness. Perhaps ours should be a pilgrimage, a "peregrinacion," which could arrive at Sacramento on Easter Sunday. (Ganz 1994)

The weaving together of diverse networks of people and ideas that characterized the planning of the march characterized preparations for its kickoff, as well. It was timed for March 17, the day after the Senate Subcommittee on Migratory Labor, with participation from Senator Robert Kennedy, was to hold hearings in Delano (Taylor 1975; Ganz 1994). This was an event organized with Reuther's help that would bring national media to Delano (Taylor 1975; Levy 1975; Daniel 1987). The march was targeted to accomplish three objectives: to win support for the strike by persuading workers along the march route to stay out of Delano when work began in the spring; to pressure Democratic Governor Edmund G. Brown, who was up for election that year and concerned about Mexican American voters, to intervene in the dispute; and to gain public support for the Schenley Boycott by demonstrating the injustice of the farmworkers' plight (Taylor 1975; Ganz 1994; Drake 1997). The march was led by a farmworker carrying a banner of Our Lady of Guadalupe, the patroness of Mexico, portraits of campesino leader Emiliano Zapata, and banners proclaiming "peregrinacion, penitencia, revolucion": pilgrimage, penance, revolution (Taylor 1975; Levy 1975). The marchers carried placards calling on supporters to boycott Schenley (Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977). The AWOC was again invited to participate, but Green declined, declaring the AWOC was involved in "a trade union dispute, not a civil rights movement or a religious crusade" (Taylor 1975, p. 153).

The march attracted wide public attention, particularly after television images of Delano police trying to block its departure evoked images of similar police lines in Selma, Alabama, the year before (Taylor 1975; Levy 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977). On April 3, 1966, one week before the march was to arrive in Sacramento, following mediation by a Bartenders'

Union representative, Schenley recognized the UFW covering the 500 grape workers it employed in Delano (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Levitt 1996; Hartmire 1996). The 82 original farmworker marchers reached Sacramento accompanied by 10,000 farmworkers and supporters.

This NFWA success dramatically altered the terms of the farm labor conflict and the arena within which the struggle was being waged. Because of the strategic capacity it had developed, the union had learned to keep finding ways to turn meager resources into effective economic weapons. The world of agribusiness turned out to be less monolithic than had been thought as divisions emerged between local agricultural corporations, whose entire business was farming, and national corporations, with major investments in brand names (Brown 1972; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977). It made little sense for large corporations to risk compromising their brands for the sake of minor farming operations, especially when they had union contracts elsewhere (Levitt 1996). Farmworkers for the first time began to believe unionization was achievable, especially when they experienced the reality of the Schenley Contract: it not only increased wages, but eliminated the hated labor contractor system, provided for seniority and job security, and included a medical plan (Brown 1972; Taylor 1975; Medina 1998). The newly appointed AFL-CIO organizing director, William Kircher, fired Green, closed up most of AWOC's operations, and began negotiating a merger with the NFWA (Taylor 1975). The eventual agreement recognized the autonomy of a new United Farm Workers Organizing Committee (UFWOC) and committed AFL-CIO financial support of $150,000 per year (Taylor 1975). The Teamsters discovered it had a common interest with the agribusiness community in stopping the UFW, setting the stage for 11 subsequent years of conflict. Underlying its success was the UFW's commitment to its mission and its growing capacity to accomplish it more effectively. As Chavez often said, "It's not so important that you make the right decision. What is important is that you learn to do all you can to make the decision you do make the right decision" (Ganz 1993).

Although the Schenley Boycott was a crucial turning point on NFWA's path to success, its significance for this analysis is not as an isolated event—or "good tactic"—but rather as an outcome of the strategic capacity the NFWA had generated since the beginning of the grape strike. NFWA's decision to boycott Schenley, like the other choices examined in this study, was a strategic response to a new challenge—how to maintain pressure on the employers despite the end of the grape harvest. Just as the effectiveness of NFWA's responses were related to the breadth of information to which it had access, its heuristic processes, and the depth of its motivation, the ineffectiveness of AWOC's responses were due to the limited salience of its information, the constraints on its creativity, and a

marginal level of commitment. As Green said when asked to support NFWA's tactics: "This is an honest to goodness trade union fight, not a civil rights demonstration. . . . I am relying on union support. . . . The NFWA is administered by ministers. . . . We (AWOC) will continue in our own union way" (Taylor 1975, p. 155).

CONCLUSIONS

This article began by posing the question of why organizing success came to the fledgling UFW and not to the well-established union with which it found itself in competition. Studying the influence of strategy reveals the role of resourcefulness in power—as mythically memorialized in tales of David and Goliath or Odysseus and the Trojans. One way groups compensate for a lack of material resources is through creative strategy, a function of access to a diversity of salient information, heuristic facility, and motivation—a result of the way the composition of leadership teams and organizational structures influence interaction with the environment. Changing environments generate new opportunities—and constraints—but the significance of those opportunities or constraints emerges from the hearts, heads, and hands of the actors who develop the means of acting upon them.

As summarized in table 2, the source of difference in the strategic capacity of the two groups was in observable differences in leadership and organization. The contrast in the biography, networks, and repertoires of the leadership and deliberative processes, resource flows, and accountability structures of the organizations could not have been greater. Because strategy unfolds as a process, it is important to pay attention to the mechanisms that generate it—not only to the role of specific strategies in specific outcomes. Since strategy is interactive, getting it "right" in a big way is likely to be evidence of having learned how to "get it right" in numerous small ways—and doing it time after time. This can only be studied by observing organizations over time.

The UFW's strategy thus turned out to be more effective than that of the AWOC because of the way in which it was developed. It drew on elements of an ethnic labor association (reminiscent of earlier organizing attempts by farmworkers of color), a union, and community organizing drives in a new synthesis that went far beyond its individual components as its founders engaged environmental challenges by adapting familiar repertoires to new uses. The UFW's response to the crisis precipitated by the grape strike was to draw on the Civil Rights movement to reframe its effort as a farmworker movement. This then led to development of a "dual strategy" based on mobilization of workers (without whom there would have been no people, no cause, and no movement) along with the

TABLE 2

COMPARISON OF AWOC AND UFW STRATEGIC CAPACITY

	AWOC	UFW
Leadership:		
Biography	Little diversity of experience	Diversity of experience
	No salient local knowledge	Salient local knowledge, broader context
	Professional commitment	Personal, vocational commitment
Networks	No strong ties to constituency	Strong ties to constituencies
	Few salient weak ties	Weak ties across constituencies
	Little diversity of ties	Diversity of ties
Repertoires	No salience to constituencies	Salience to constituencies
	Little diversity of repertoires	Diversity of repertoires
Organization:		
Deliberation	No regular meetings	Regular meetings
	No strategy sessions	Regular strategy sessions
	Closed to diverse perspectives	Open to diverse perspectives
	Not authoritative	Authoritative
Resource flows	Resources flow top down	Resources flow bottom up
	Resources flow from outside: single source	Resource flow inside and outside: multiple sources
	Resources depend on internal politics	Resources depend on task effectiveness
	Based on financial resources	Based on people resources
	Little strategic autonomy	Strategic autonomy
Accountability	No constituency accountability	Constituency accountability
	Hierarchical accountability	Mutual accountability
	Bureaucratic leadership selection	Democratic, entrepreneurial selection

mobilization of urban supporters (without whom there would have been no financial, political, and economic resources). By recontextualizing the arena of combat to reach beyond the fields to the cities, the UFW turned the moral tables on the growers, exposing what growers considered to be a legitimate exercise of their authority as illegitimate in the public domain (much as had occurred in the Civil Rights movement). The significance of this strategic stream for this article is not in its particulars—although it points to important lessons about targeting, timing, and tactics—but in that it emerged from a strategic capacity that could have generated a different strategic stream in different circumstances.

Focusing on strategic capacity—or its absence—may also help account for the outcome of other organizing efforts. In the course of American labor history, the question remains of why the breakaway CIO successfully organized industrial workers in the 1930s, a job the AFL would not or could not do. A more recent question, however, is why the semi-independent Harvard Union of Clerical and Technical Workers (HUCTW) succeeded where the United Auto Workers (UAW) District 65 repeatedly failed (Hoerr 1997). Evidence suggests the UAW was hamstrung by factors similar to those that limited the AWOC, while the HUCTW's effectiveness was rooted in strategic capacity very similar to that of the UFW—although it played out in different specific strategies. Similarly, scholars have only begun to evaluate the efforts of a revived AFL-CIO to organize today (Bronfenbrenner and Juravich 1998), but most of the attention has been on tactical efficacy rather than on the role of leadership and organization in building strategic capacity.

Understanding strategic capacity may be useful not only in unraveling social movements—it can help explain the outcomes of other conflicts in which new groups are far more effective than well-established ones, such as the high-tech industry. Although Stinchcombe (1965) argued new organizations must overcome a "liability of newness," my research shows there may be a "liability of senescence" and that newness can be an asset. AWOC leaders, selected for reasons that had little to do with the needs of the environment within which they were to work, developed strategy within an organizational setting better equipped to reproduce past routines than to innovate new ones. Ironically, the abundance of internal resources to which well-established groups have access may make it harder to innovate by making it easier for them to keep doing the same thing wrong. New groups, on the other hand, often lack conventional resources, but the richness of their strategic capacity—aspects of their leadership and organization in relation to the environment specified here—can offset this.

Finally, this approach offers fresh ways to make intractable problems actionable by holding out the possibility of change. People can generate

the power to resolve grievances not only if those with power decide to use it on their behalf, but also if they can develop the capacity to out think and outlast their opponents—a matter of leadership and organization. As students of "street smarts" have long understood, "resourcefulness" can sometimes compensate for a lack of resources. While learning about how the environment influences actors is very important, learning more about how actors influence the environment is the first step not only to understanding the world, but to changing it.

APPENDIX

Biographical Sketches

AWOC Leadership

George Meany, 66, white Irish American, Roman Catholic, married, three children, high school graduate, a New Yorker, was president of the AFL-CIO.[18] A lifelong leader of the plumbers' union, the building trades, and the AFL—as was his father before him—he had no real interest in organizing farmworkers. He once asked, "Why should we worry about organizing groups of people who do not appear to want to be organized?" (Zieger 1987, p. 342). A strong anticommunist, he was suspicious of the emergent Civil Rights movement, denying AFL-CIO support for the 1963 March on Washington. He possessed an impressive tactical repertoire in internal union politics and legislative lobbying, which, combined with a lack of organizing experience, gave him a marked preference for legislative strategy (Mitchell 1979; London and Anderson 1970; Fink 1974; Zieger 1987).

John Livingston, 52, white, Protestant, married, was the director of organizing. Growing up on a Missouri farm, Livingston attended high school for two years before going to work for General Motors in St. Louis. He learned his tactical repertoire as a leader in the organization of the auto industry in the 1930s. Originally recruited by Norman Smith, he rose to become a vice president of the UAW, a position he left to join the AFL-CIO in 1955. After his retirement in 1965, he became director of union relations for the National Alliance of Businessmen. Although he had no networks linking him to the world of farmworkers, they did extend to former UAW organizers, which is how he found Norman Smith (Fink 1974; Reuther 1976; Mitchell 1979; London and Anderson 1970; Meister and Loftis 1977; Zieger 1987; Lichtenstein 1968).

Norman Smith, 62, white, Protestant, unmarried, also from a Missouri

[18] Ages given are at time participants undertook farmworker organizing.

farm family, was the first AWOC director. A UAW industrial organizer in the 1930s who had recruited Livingston. After serving as a Seabee in World War II, Smith had been an industrial supervisor for 18 years. He had no agricultural experience, spoke no Spanish, and had no links to the farmworker world. The tactical repertoire he learned in the auto industry influenced his search for an equivalent of the "plant gate," the early morning shape-ups that led him to target a segment of the work force least likely to provide a stable membership base (Mitchell 1979; London and Anderson 1970; Meister and Loftis 1977; Jenkins 1985; Anderson 1996).

A. C. Green, 60, white, Protestant, was the second AWOC director. Green had been a Plasterers Union official since his youth, and for the previous 12 years, director of the California AFL-CIO COPE (Committee on Political Education). Despite growing up in the San Joaquin Valley town of Modesto, a center for Anglo cannery workers, he had no links to the farmworker world. The tactical repertoire he learned in the building trades was the source of the labor contractor tactics that proved so inappropriate in this setting (London and Anderson 1970; Meister and Loftis 1977; Jenkins 1985; Anderson 1996).

AWOC Staff

Dr. Ernesto Galarza, 54, Mexican, Roman Catholic, married, three children, was hired by Livingston to assist Smith. Galarza, who emigrated with his family from Mexico in 1910, had grown up in Sacramento, won scholarships to Occidental College, Stanford, and earned a Ph.D. in economics at Columbia. From 1934 to 1946 he did research for the Pan American Union, becoming an expert on the wartime bracero program. In 1947, hired by H. L. Mitchell as research director for the AFL's National Farm Labor Union (NFLU), he settled with his family in San Jose. After leading a number of unsuccessful organizing attempts in the early 1950s, he dedicated himself to "exposure" of the abuses of the bracero program, publishing the influential *Strangers in Our Fields* in 1956. Passed over for the AWOC directorship, he resigned after six months in a dispute over whether the old NFLU (now called the National Agricultural Workers Union [NAWU]) would have jurisdiction to workers organized by the AWOC (London and Anderson 1970; Anderson 1996).

Father Tom McCullough, 37, white, Roman Catholic, son of a Bay Area trade unionist, was one of a network of Roman Catholic priests with a ministry to farmworkers, the California Mission Band. Meeting as seminarians at St. Patrick's Seminary, Menlo Park, they were constituted as the Missionary Apostolate of the San Francisco Diocese in 1950. McCullough's associate was Father Donald McDonnell, the San Jose priest who

interested Cesar Chavez in organizing. In the late 1950s, McCullough organized a mutual benefit association among his Stockton farmworker parishioners, which was a model for the UFW's work a number of years later. He merged his group into the AWOC when it began, thinking "they were the professionals" (London and Anderson 1970; Meister and Loftis 1977; Jenkins 1985; Anderson 1996).

Dolores Huerta, 30, Mexican American, Roman Catholic, possessed years of community organizing experience working with Fred Ross and Cesar Chavez. She would later become Chavez's second in command (see below for more).

Henry Anderson, 32, white, married, had grown up in the Bay Area, served in World War II, was educated at Pomona College and Stanford, and earned masters degrees in sociology and public health at the University of California, Berkeley. Doing research for the California Department of Public Health, he became an expert on the abuses of the bracero program and met Father McCullough and others involved in early farmworker organizing. Hired as AWOC research director by Smith in 1959, he led the volunteer organizing effort during the AWOC "hiatus" and authored a 1961 organizing plan reflecting McCullough's work and which presaged the approach Chavez would take (London and Anderson 1970; Meister and Loftis 1977; Jenkins 1985; Anderson 1996).

Larry Itliong, 47, Filipino, Roman Catholic, married, immigrated from the Philippines at 15, worked in the fields, organized for UCAPAWA CIO, was leader of ILWU local 7, formed his own Farm Labor Union in 1956, and was president of Filipino Community of Stockton, 1959. Hired as an organizer by AWOC in 1960, he led the Delano Grape Strike in 1956. He became assistant to Chavez in the merger of UFWOC (Scharlin and Villanueva 1992; Taylor 1975; Watson 1999).

UFW Leadership

Cesar Chavez, president of the NFWA, was 35 in 1962. He was Mexican American, Roman Catholic, and married with eight children. He grew up in an immigrant Mexican family who, when he was 10, lost a small Arizona farm in the depression and became migrants. After he served in the Navy, he and his wife Helen settled in San Jose, where he found work in a lumberyard. He became active in the church, and Father Donald McDonnell, his parish priest, got him interested in organizing. McDonnell was associated with McCullough in the California Mission Band. He began learning organizing in 1952 when recruited by Fred Ross, an associate of Saul Alinsky's, to build the first statewide Mexican American civic association in California, the CSO. In this work, he developed statewide networks of Mexican American activists, religious groups, liberal Demo-

crats, and unions—which went far beyond ties he retained within the farmworker community. His first union organizing experience was a 1958 United Packing House Workers drive in the Oxnard citrus packing sheds, an effort backed by the CSO. Early in 1962, during the hiatus in the AWOC, he resigned as executive director of the CSO when it rejected his proposal to organize farmworkers. Relying on his savings, he moved to Delano, where he had family, to begin organizing. He also turned down a Kennedy administration job offer to be Peace Corps director in Venezuela (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Ross 1989; Daniel 1987).

Dolores Huerta, secretary of the NFWA, was 30 in 1959 when she became active with the AWOC, and 33 when she joined Chavez in 1962. She was Mexican American, Roman Catholic, and married with six children. Huerta was a native of New Mexico where her father had organized for the miners' union and served for a term in the New Mexico legislature. She grew up in Stockton where her mother ran a boarding house. After graduating from the College of the Pacific, she was recruited by Ross for work with the CSO in 1953. After working briefly with the AWOC in 1959, she led a successful CSO campaign to extend California old-age pensions to noncitizens. She joined Chavez part time in 1962, going to work full time with the NFWA in 1964 (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977).

Antonio Orendain, treasurer of the NFWA, was a farmworker, about 30, immigrated from Mexico in 1956, Roman Catholic, and married. He and his wife Raquel had been active leaders in the CSO since 1958 (Brown 1972; Levy 1975; Padilla 1999).

Gilbert Padilla, NFWA vice president, was 35, Mexican American, Roman Catholic, and married with four children. Padilla had grown up on a farm outside Fresno, served in the Army, worked as a cleaner, and had been recruited by Chavez into the CSO in 1956, first as a leader and later as a full-time organizer (Brown 1972; Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Smith 1987; Drake 1997; Padilla 1999).

Julio Hernandez, NFWA vice president, was 41, immigrated from Mexico in 1944, Roman Catholic, and married with nine children. He and his wife, Josefina, were farmworkers, had been labor contractors, joined CSO, and were among the first recruited by Chavez for the NFWA. Hernandez served as president of the Farm Workers Credit Union (Brown 1972; Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Smith 1987).

Chris Hartmire, director of the California Migrant Ministry (CMM), was 29, white, Presbyterian, and married with two children. After graduating from Princeton and serving in the Navy for three years, he attended Union Theological Seminary (UTS). There, in 1954, he began work in the East Harlem Ministry and was recruited by Doug Stills, the Alinsky-

trained director of the CMM, an agency of the National Council of Churches. The CMM was in transition from a social service program to a social action program. He met Chavez and Ross in 1959 when he was sent to "train" with them in the CSO. Hartmire had become director of the CMM in 1961, the year he met Alinsky and participated in a CORE-sponsored "Freedom Ride" (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Smith 1987; Drake 1997; Hartmire 1996).

Jim Drake, a California Migrant Ministry "minister-organizer" was 24, white, United Church of Christ, and married with two children. Drake, who also attended Union Theological Seminary, was one of Hartmire's first recruits for his new CMM program. He grew up in a Mexican farmworker community in Southern California where his father had served as a teacher and minister (Levy 1975; Taylor 1975; Meister and Loftis 1977; Hartmire 1996; Drake 1997).

UFW Volunteers

New young farmworker leaders emerged from striking farmworker families. They served as picket captains, organizers, and boycott directors; some later rose to top leadership positions in the union. Eliseo Medina, for example, an 18-year-old member of a striking family, and a Mexican immigrant, was trained as an organizer, became Chicago boycott director, director of the UFW's field offices, and was later elected as vice president of the UFW. Marcos Munoz, a 20-year-old Mexican immigrant from Bakersfield, who was a very talented organizer but could neither read nor write English or Spanish, became the Boston boycott director. Maria Saludado, 22, and her sisters, Petra and Antonia, grew up in a farmworker family, began working in the fields as children, and became boycott organizers in Philadelphia, New York, Chicago, and elsewhere (Rose 1995). Of 40 boycott cities operating at the peak of the grape boycott, some 35 were led by new farmworker leaders (Brown 1972).

Students involved in the Civil Rights movement came to Delano as volunteers, assuming a wide variety of roles as organizers, boycotters, administrators, and so on (Nelson 1966; Taylor 1975; Levy 1975). Luis Valdez, for example, a 23-year-old Chicano student from a farmworker family, came to Delano and organized the Teatro Campesino, a strikers' theater troop that generated songs and skits for the strike and served as a model for urban Chicano theater throughout the Southwest (Mathiessen 1969). Jessica Govea, an 18-year-old Chicana from Bakersfield whose family had been active in the CSO, dropped out of college, went to work in the union's service program, became an organizer, designed the union's medical program, and was elected to the national executive board. After growing up in Bakersfield, attending Harvard for three years, and serving

with SNCC for two years, I came to the UFW at age 22, served in a variety of roles, eventually became director of organizing, and was elected to the national executive board (Levy 1975).

Religious activists inspired by the Civil Rights movement, recruited by the Migrant Ministry, or motivated by Vatican II came to serve in a variety of roles (Hartmire 1996; Chatfield 1996; Drake 1997). Leroy Chatfield, for example, a former Christian Brother who had been associated with the Catholic Worker, became director of the union's service center and medical fund.

Lawyers drawn to public service, but attracted to the opportunity to practice more "political" law than was possible through legal services corporations, came to serve as a full-time and part-time resource for the UFW (Chatfield 1996; Cohen 1995; Levy 1975). Jerry Cohen, for example, resigned from California Rural Legal Assistance (CRLA) to come to work full time for the UFW, eventually becoming its general counsel and authoring the California Agricultural Labor Relations Act of 1975.

TABLE A1

LEADERSHIP COMPARISON

Name	Age	Race/Ethnicity	Religion
AWOC leadership:			
George Meany	66	White/Irish-American	Roman Catholic
John Livingston	52	White	Protestant
Norman Smith	61	White	Protestant
A. C. Green	60	White	Protestant
AWOC staff:			
Father Tom McCullough	37	White	Roman Catholic
Dolores Huerta	30	Mexican-American	Roman Catholic
Henry Anderson	32	White	. . .
Larry Itliong	50	Filipino	Roman Catholic
Dr. Ernesto Galarza	54	Mexican	Roman Catholic
NFWA leadership:			
Cesar Chavez	35	Mexican-American	Roman Catholic
Dolores Huerta	33	Mexican-American	Roman Catholic
Antonio Orendain	30	Mexican	Roman Catholic
Gilbert Padilla	35	Mexican-American	Roman Catholic
Julio Hernandez	41	Mexican	Roman Catholic
Rodrigo Terronez	35	Mexican	Roman Catholic
Chris Hartmire	29	White	Presbyterian
Jim Drake	24	White	United Church of Christ
NFWA volunteers:			
Eliseo Medina	18	Mexican	Roman Catholic
Marcos Munoz	23	Mexican	Roman Catholic
Maria Saludado	22	Mexican	Roman Catholic
Luis Valdez	23	Mexican-American	Roman Catholic
Marshall Ganz	22	White	Jewish
Jessica Govea	18	Mexican-American	Roman Catholic
Leroy Chatfield	27	White	Roman Catholic
Jerry Cohen	27	White	Jewish

SOURCE.—Anderson (1996); Brown (1972); Chatfield (1996); Cohen (1995); Daniel (1987); Drake (1997); Fink (1974); Hartmire (1996); Jenkins (1985); Levy (1975); London and Anderson (1970); Mathiessen (1969); Medina (1998); Meister and Loftis (1977); Mitchell (1979); Nelson (1966); Padilla (1999); Reuther (1976); Rose (1995); Ross (1989); Scharlin and Villanueva (1992); Smith (1987); Taylor (1975); Zieger (1987).

NOTE.—Age = time at which participants undertook farmworker organizing. Huerta is listed twice—she was 30 when she began working with AWOC and 33 when she began working with the UFW.

Regional Background	Position	Family Background
New York, District of Columbia	AFL-CIO president	Construction union officials
St. Louis, Detroit, District of Columbia	Director of organizing	Missouri farm family
Detroit, Los Angeles	AWOC director	
Modesto	AWOC director	
Oakland, Stockton	Volunteer organizer	Building trades, union
New Mexico, Stockton	Organizer	Mining, boarding house
Palo Alto, Berkeley	AWOC research director	Professional, teaching
Philippines, Stockton, Delano	Organizer	Immigrant, rural Philippines
Sacramento, New York, District of Columbia, San Jose	AWOC assistant director	Immigrant farmworkers
Yuma, San Jose, Delano	NFWA president	Immigrant small farmers, farmworkers
New Mexico, Stockton	NFWA secretary	Mining, small business
Mexico, Hanford	NFWA treasurer	Immigrant farmworkers
Los Banos, Hanford	NFWA vice president	Labor, immigrant farmworkers
Mexico, Corcoran	NFWA vice president	Labor, immigrant
Mexico, Hanford	NFWA vice president	Immigrant farmworkers
New York, Los Angeles	CMM director	Professional, business
Oklahoma, Indio, New York	CMM minister organizer	Professional, ministry, teaching
Mexico, Delano	Organizer/boycotter	Immigrant farmworkers
Mexico, Bakersfield	Organizer/boycotter	Immigrant farmworkers
Mexico, Delano	Organizer/boycotter	Immigrant farmworkers
Delano, San Jose	Teatro Campesino	Farmworkers, laborers
Bakersfield	Organizer	Professional, ministry, teaching
Bakersfield	Organizer, social services	Immigrant railroad, farmworkers
Sacramento	Organizer, social services	Farmers, business
District of Columbia, Japan	Lawyer	Professional, medical, military

Abbreviations for organizations are AFL (American Federation of Labor); CIO (Congress of Industrial Organizations); CMM (California Migrant Ministry); CRLA (California Rural Legal Assistance); CSO (Community Service Organization); ILWU (International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union); SNCC (Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee); UAW (United Auto Workers); UTS (Union Theological Seminary). Other abbreviations are M (married); A (active spouse); S (single); D (divorced); and C (number of children).

TABLE A1 (*Continued*)

Name	Family	Education, Work, Organizing Experience
AWOC leadership:		
George Meany	M, 3C	High school, plumber, AFL union official
John Livingston	M	10th grade, autoworker, UAW union official
Norman Smith	S	Autoworker, UAW organizer, Seabee industrial supervisor
A. C. Green	S	AFL union official, California COPE director
AWOC staff:		
Father Tom McCullough	S	Franciscan priest, farmworker organizer, AWO
Dolores Huerta	M	College of Pacific, CSO organizer, lobbyist
Henry Anderson	M	UC Berkeley, M.D., researcher, advocate
Larry Itliong	M	6th grade, farmworker, UCAPAWA organizer, community leader
Dr. Ernesto Galarza	M, 2C	Occidental, Stanford, Columbia Ph.D., Pan-American Union, researcher, advocate, NFLU, NAWU
NFWA leadership:		
Cesar Chavez	M, A, 8C	8th grade, farm work, Navy, laborer, CSO, organizer
Dolores Huerta	D, 6C	College of Pacific, CSO organizer, lobbyist, AWOC
Antonio Orendain	M, A, 2C	Farm work, CSO
Gilbert Padilla	M, 4C	Farm work, Army, small business, CSO
Julio Hernandez	M, A, 9C	Farm work, labor contractor, CSO
Rodrigo Terronez	M	Farmworker, CSO
Chris Hartmire	M, 2C	Princeton, UTS, East Harlem Ministry, Navy
Jim Drake	M, 2C	UTS
NFWA volunteers:		
Eliseo Medina	S	Farm work
Marcos Munoz	M, 1C	Farm work
Maria Saludado	S	Farm work
Luis Valdez	S	San Jose State, SNCC, San Francisco mime troop
Marshall Ganz	S	Harvard, SNCC
Jessica Govea	S	Bakersfield College, CSO
Leroy Chatfield	M	Christian Brothers, vice principal, teaching
Jerry Cohen	M, 1C	Amherst College, UC Berkeley Law School, CRLA

Work Commitment	Network Affiliation	Repertoires
Professional	AFL-CIO, Democrats, Roman Catholics	Union politics, legislative lobbying, elite politics
Professional	UAW, Democrats	CIO 1930–40s auto organizing, union politics
Professional	UAW, Democrats	CIO 1930s auto organizing, supervisor
Professional	Building trades, Democrats	Building trades, COPE
Vocational	Farmworkers, Roman Catholics, farmworker advocates	Religious community, mutual benefit association
Personal/vocational	CSO, Democrats, farmworkers	Community organizing, lobbying
Vocational	Students, liberals, farmworker advocates	Research, advocacy
Personal/vocational	Filipino crew leaders, union organizers	Cannery organizing, crew and community leadership
Personal/vocational	NFLU, farmworker advocates, Democrats	Research, lobbying, and advocacy
Personal/vocational	Family, farmworkers, CSO, Roman Catholics, Democrats, Mexican Americans	Community organizing, political organizing
Personal/vocational	Family, CSO, Democrats, liberals	Community organizing, lobbying
Personal/vocational	Family, farmworkers, CSO	Community organizing
Personal/vocational	Family, farmworkers, CSO	Community organizing
Personal	Family, farmworkers	Crew leader, community organizing
Personal	Family, farmworkers, CSO	Community organizing
Vocational	CMM, California and U.S. church leaders, farmworker advocates	Seminary, community organizing
Personal	CMM	Seminary, community organizing
Personal	Family, farmworkers	
Personal	Family, farmworkers	
Personal	Family, farmworkers	
Personal/vocational	Family, student activists, liberals	Student organizing, political theater
Vocational	Civil rights groups, student groups	Civil rights organizing
Personal/vocational	Family, CSO	CSO
Vocational	Roman Catholic	Religious community, teaching
Vocational	Legal activists, lawyers	Advocacy, antiwar protests

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