


SINGLE-ISSUE NEGOTIATIONS

NEGOTIATION STRATEGY CEMS MIM Programme 1st Semester, 2024/2025

Prof. Luís Almeida Costa Nova School of Business and Economics


PRICE NEGOTIATIONS - KEY DIMENSIONS (*)



(*) Acknowledgement: This handout is based on I. Dierickx, "Price Negotiations - The Distributive Dimension of Bargaining", 2008, mimeo, which is used with his kind permission.

IMPLICATIONS

- EPISY CASE – INFORMATION AND VALUATION SCENARIOS ARE NOT




☑ Independent Private Values (IPV)

II ^V- NEGOTIATION STRATEGY: OUR MAIN TASK AS A NEGOTIATOR IS TO <u>PROBE FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION</u>

[\Rightarrow What negotiators should do is to eliminate ?????? and to take advantage of differences in valuation to price discriminate]

STRUCTURE OF THE NEGOTIATION



EXAMPLE:

SELLER: "Look, it's either 250 €/m² or no deal. And no more "ifs and buts". 250 is my final offer."

BUYER: "Shouldn't we look for a price that is fair to both of us? Sure, this lot has special value to me, but it is virtually worthless to you. If I don't buy it, you couldn't get more than $15 \notin m^2$. I would be happy to buy the land, but I don't think it is fair for you to insist on a windfall profit. The adjacent lots sold for $80 \notin m^2$. I do not see why a tiny plot which can only be used as a garden would be worth more than three times as much. I'm sorry, but 250 Euros is simply not realistic."

SELLER: "I told you, 250 €/m² is my final offer. Take it or leave it."

DETERMINING OUR LIMIT:

☑ OBJECTIVE COMPUTATION OF OUR <u>BATNA</u> (Best Alternative to a Negotiated Agreement)

DETERMINING OUR TARGET

EXAMPLE:

- Pamphlet distributed by Theodore Roosevelt during the U.S. Presidential Campaign, in 1912.

- George Perkins (Campaign Manager):

"We are planning to distribute many pamphlets with Roosevelt's picture on the cover. It will be great publicity for the studio whose photograph we use. How much will you pay us to use yours? Respond immediately."

- Answer:

"We've never done this before, but, under the circumstances, we'd be pleased to offer you \$250".

DETERMINING OUR TARGET:

☑ LOOK OUTWARD - What is their perception of the problem? What options do they have? What are their benefits?

☑ TARGETS ARE OFTEN UNDULY CONDITIONED BY PRECEDENTS

Tactical Issues Discussed



- REACTING TO OPENING OFFERS

- CONCESSION PATTERNS

1 – A MODERATE (OR REASONABLE) OFFER, i.e., an offer which should be acceptable to the other side and should allow both parties to quickly arrive at a fair deal. "FUZZY RANGE" **RP**_s **RP**_B **MODERATE OFFER** "YES" (??) - LEAVES # "ON THE THELE - LEAVES LITTLE BAR LATIN'RG ROOM INVICES ME OMEN SIDE TO REVISE EXPECTATION ! CREATES AN ASYMMETRY AGAINT U)

⇒ "BOULWARIAN OFFER" (OR "BOULWARISM"), a specific and extreme

case of a moderate or reasonable offer:

FACTS + LOGIC = THE 'FAIR' PRICE

PROBLEMS: PROCESS PERCEIVED AS UNFAIR


WHAT IS FAIR?

EXCESSIVE RIGIDITY

2 – AN EXTREME OFFER, to shake up the other side

"If agreement is usually found between the two starting points, there is no point in making moderate offers. Good technique would suggest a point of departure far more extreme than one is willing to accept. The more outrageous the initial proposition, the better is the prospect that what one 'really' wants will be considered a compromise".

Kissinger, Henry A., "The Necessity of Choice", NY, Harper and Row: 205



PROBLEM: LOSS OF CREDIBILITY - an extreme offer will be recognised as insincere, i.e., as a deliberate ploy to gain an unfair advantage

HOW FAR CAN I GO WITHOUT LOSING CREDIBILITY?

EXAMPLE I

- RP_b = 5500 (common knowledge)
- The seller offers 7000. Is this offer credible?

Conclusion: PERFECT INFORMATION ⇒ CREDIBLE = ACCEPTABLE


EXAMPLE II


- RP_b = 5500 (the seller does not know this value and the buyer knows that)
- How would the buyer react to an offer of 7000?
 - And if the object is available in the market at prices between 5200 and 5800?

Conclusion: UNCERTAINTY \Rightarrow UNACCEPTABLE OFFERS MAY BE CREDIBLE

MOST EFFICIENT OFFER:

3 – A "TOUGH" OFFER, *i.e.*, an offer which is not acceptable, yet "discussable" (credible)






1 - HOW TO REACT TO AN OFFER WHICH IS NOT ACCEPTABLE, YET "DISCUSSABLE"? COUNTER WITH A SIMILAR OFFER


2 - HOW TO REACT TO A BOULWARE-STYLE OFFER?

EXAMPLE

DUVERGER: "Listen. You don't want to sell for less than 15. I don't want to buy for more than 150. I don't see any reason why your land should be worth more than mine. Your lot is right next to my two lots, and they're worth $150 \notin m^2$. I say we split it 50/50. You win, I win. We split the difference: $82.5 \notin m^2$ or 33,000for the lot. This is my final offer."



REACTING TO OPENING OFFERS



CONCESSION PATTERNS

OBJECTIVES

1 - TO FIND OUT THE OTHER SIDE'S POINT OF INDIFFERENCE (PROBING)


\Rightarrow AVOID OVERSHOOTING

2 - TO MANAGE OUR OPPONENT'S BELIEFS ABOUT OUR OWN RESERVATION PRICE (SIGNALLING)

 \Rightarrow SUGGEST AN INCREASING LIKELIHOOD THAT THE NEGOTIATION WILL RESULT IN AN IMPASSE IF OUR OFFER IS NOT ACCEPTED

CONCESSION PATTERNS





E.g. 2: 8000 7000 6000 / 7000 6200 5650

GENERAL RULES

RULE # 1: MOVE IN INCREASINGLY SMALLER STEPS

RULE # 2: MOVE TOWARDS GREATER PRECISION AS WE GET A BETTER HANDLE ON THE OTHER SIDE'S 'RP'

RULE # 3: WITH EACH CONSECUTIVE CONCESSION, THINK LONGER, ASK MORE CLARIFYING QUESTIONS, ADD MORE "IFS"

RULE # 4: UNLESS A CONCESSION HAS EXPLICITLY BEEN LABELLED AS "TENTATIVE", IT CANNOT BE WITHDRAWN AT A LATER STAGE IN THE NEGOTIATION

RULE # 5: GIVE YOUR COUNTERPART A TARGET TO SHOOT FOR BY TELLING HIM WHAT HE CANNOT GET

CONCESSION PATTERNS

EXAMPLE

E.g. 3: "MEXICAN SELLING A BRIEFCASE"

[Raiffa, H. The Art and Science of Negotiation, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1982, p.51]

- 15 "not interested"
- 14 "I already have a perfectly good briefcase"
- 13 "I'm sorry"
- 12 "I'm really sorry"
- 11 "really"
 - ???!

12

